Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add joaoguirunas/team-os --skill dev-security-patternsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/joaoguirunas/team-osWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/joaoguirunas/team-os/dev-security-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/joaoguirunas/team-os/dev-security-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/joaoguirunas/team-os/dev-security-patterns/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/joaoguirunas/team-os/dev-security-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/joaoguirunas/team-os/dev-security-patterns.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.03195 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.01278 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00639 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00319 |
Grade A, and why
dev-security-patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 16d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 241 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Patterns — Software Complexo
JWT — Autenticação
// Geração
const accessToken = jwt.sign(
{ userId: user.id, role: user.role },
process.env.JWT_SECRET!,
{ expiresIn: '15m' } // curto
)
const refreshToken = jwt.sign(
{ userId: user.id },
process.env.JWT_REFRESH_SECRET!,
{ expiresIn: '7d' }
)
// Validação em middleware
const verifyToken = (req, res, next) => {
const token = req.headers.authorization?.split(' ')[1]
if (!token) return res.status(401).json({ error: { code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', requestId: req.requestId } })
try {
req.user = jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET!)
next()
} catch {
return res.status(401).json({ error: { code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', requestId: req.requestId } })
}
}
Regras: Access token 15min. Refresh token 7 dias com rotação. Nunca localStorage — usar httpOnly cookie. Secret mínimo 256 bits.
Autorização — RBAC
const requireRole = (...roles: string[]) => (req, res, next) => {
if (!roles.includes(req.user.role)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', requestId: req.requestId } })
}
next()
}
// Uso
router.delete('/users/:id', verifyToken, requireRole('admin'), deleteUser)
Row Level Security (RLS — Supabase/Postgres)
-- Habilitar RLS
ALTER TABLE orders ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- Usuário vê apenas seus dados
CREATE POLICY "user_own_orders" ON orders
FOR ALL USING (auth.uid() = user_id);
-- Admin vê tudo — papel vem de app_metadata (só o servidor escreve)
CREATE POLICY "admin_all_orders" ON orders
FOR ALL USING ((auth.jwt() -> 'app_metadata' ->> 'role') = 'admin');
RLS é a última linha de defesa — aplicar em todas as tabelas com dados de usuário.
auth.jwt() ->> 'role'(claim de topo) é o papel do Postgres (authenticated/anon), não o papel da aplicação — política escrita assim nunca casa.- Nunca autorizar por
user_metadata(raw_user_meta_data): o próprio usuário edita esse campo pela API de auth e se dá qualquer papel. Papel de aplicação mora emapp_metadataou numa tabela de papéis. - "RLS ativo" não prova nada: RLS ligado sem policy nega tudo; RLS com
USING (true)libera tudo. Leia a policy. - Bucket do Storage é tabela também (
storage.objects) —USING (true)ali expõe todos os arquivos.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 16d ago Changed · +63 lines · +32 tokens per session 35c03207436e
- 27d ago Changed 7b766e47d107
- 1mo ago First seen · 178 lines · 36 tokens per session scan A a58028daceb7
dev-security-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository joaoguirunas/team-os (5 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 3,195 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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