Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add JustineDevs/premortem --skill llm-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/JustineDevs/premortemWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/justinedevs/premortem/llm-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/justinedevs/premortem/llm-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/justinedevs/premortem/llm-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/justinedevs/premortem/llm-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/justinedevs/premortem/llm-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00118 | $0.02657 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00059 | $0.01328 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00531 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00266 |
Grade A, and why
llm-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 244 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
LLM Security Testing
Thin router skill for security testing of LLM applications and AI agents. Covers the OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) with a 2026-grade threat model for frontier-model agentic systems: indirect injection, multimodal injection, MCP supply chain, memory poisoning, skill-file injection, computer-use UI injection, and agentic tool misuse.
Defensive / educational framing. Every workflow here assumes written authorization to test the target. Canary strings, throwaway accounts, and controlled endpoints are preferred over real-data exploitation at every step.
When to Use
- Testing an LLM application for prompt-injection vulnerabilities (direct or indirect)
- Assessing RAG pipeline security (poisoning, retrieval hijack, ACL)
- Red-teaming an agentic system (Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot-agent, Operator, Computer Use)
- Auditing an MCP server configuration or a new MCP server before trusting it
- Testing long-term memory / persistent-context poisoning
- Evaluating guardrails, refusal behavior, and safety classifiers
- Checking for system-prompt / tool-schema leakage
- Scoping excessive-agency / tool-misuse blast radius
- Testing multimodal injection (image, audio, video, screenshot)
- Validating skill-file / CLAUDE.md / .cursor/rules supply-chain hygiene
Trigger Phrases
"test this LLM for prompt injection", "jailbreak this model" (authorized), "test AI guardrails", "assess RAG security", "poison this RAG corpus", "test MCP server injection", "red-team this agent", "extract system prompt", "test agent tool misuse", "test computer use UI injection", "audit LLM application security", "test multimodal injection", "test memory poisoning", "audit CLAUDE.md for injection".
When NOT to Use This Skill
- LLM API endpoint hardening (auth, rate-limiting, quota abuse on
standard REST surface) → use
api-security. - Source-code review of an LLM application (SAST for Python/TS/Go
serving the model) → use
sast-orchestration. - Cloud infrastructure hosting the model (IAM, S3, secrets) → use
cloud-security/iac-security. - Classical web bugs in an LLM chatbot UI (XSS, CSRF, IDOR) → use
web-security. - Privacy / compliance assessment of training data → out of scope; requires DPIA tooling.
What ships with it
23 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- examples/indirect_injection_doc.md 2.5 KB
- examples/malicious_mcp_response.json 1.1 KB
- examples/poisoned_rag_chunk.md 2.9 KB
- payloads/encoding_obfuscation.txt 3.1 KB
- payloads/injection_2026.txt 8.4 KB
- payloads/legacy_jailbreaks.txt 2.9 KB
- payloads/multimodal_injection.md 5.2 KB
- payloads/system_prompt_extraction.txt 3.0 KB
- references/bounty_patterns_2024_2026.md 9.3 KB
- references/defense_patterns_2026.md 6.1 KB
- references/owasp_llm_top10_2025.md 3.6 KB
- references/threat_model_agents.md 4.5 KB
- schemas/finding.json 3.7 KB
- workflows/agentic_tool_misuse.md 4.9 KB
- workflows/computer_use_abuse.md 5.0 KB
- workflows/direct_injection_testing.md 3.7 KB
- workflows/excessive_agency_testing.md 3.8 KB
- workflows/indirect_injection_testing.md 4.0 KB
- workflows/mcp_server_injection.md 4.7 KB
- workflows/memory_poisoning.md 4.6 KB
- workflows/rag_poisoning.md 3.9 KB
- workflows/skill_file_injection.md 5.0 KB
- workflows/system_prompt_extraction.md 3.7 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 244 lines · 118 tokens per session scan A 6a03d32a0fbd
llm-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository JustineDevs/premortem (2 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 118 tokens to every session and 2,657 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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