Getting it into your agent
There is no command for this one: it runs only inside a plugin, and the catalogue could not identify which plugin ships it. The source is linked below.
Wrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/justinedevs/premortem/macos-security-bypass)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/justinedevs/premortem/macos-security-bypass"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/justinedevs/premortem/macos-security-bypass.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.03369 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.01684 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00674 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00337 |
Grade A, and why
macos-security-bypass scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to macos-security-bypass — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 338 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SKILL: macOS Security Bypass — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert macOS security bypass techniques. Covers TCC bypass, Gatekeeper evasion, SIP restrictions, sandbox escape, and entitlement abuse. Base models miss version-specific bypass nuances and protection interaction effects.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- macos-process-injection when you need dylib injection, XPC exploitation, or Electron abuse after achieving initial access
- linux-privilege-escalation for Unix-layer privesc techniques that also apply to macOS (SUID, cron, writable paths)
- linux-security-bypass for shared Unix security bypass concepts
Advanced Reference
Also load TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md when you need:
- Per-macOS-version TCC bypass mapping
- Protection-type-specific techniques (Camera, Microphone, FDA, Automation)
- MDM/configuration profile abuse patterns
1. TCC (TRANSPARENCY, CONSENT, CONTROL) OVERVIEW
TCC is macOS's permission framework controlling access to sensitive resources (camera, microphone, contacts, full disk access, etc.).
1.1 TCC Database Locations
| Database | Path | Controls | Protection |
|---|---|---|---|
| User-level | ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db |
Per-user consent decisions | SIP-protected since Catalina |
| System-level | /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db |
System-wide consent decisions | SIP-protected |
| MDM-managed | Via configuration profiles | Push PPPC (Privacy Preferences Policy Control) | Device management |
-- Query TCC database (requires FDA or SIP off)
sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db \
"SELECT service, client, allowed FROM access;"
1.2 TCC Bypass Categories
| Category | Mechanism | Typical Prerequisite |
|---|---|---|
| FDA app exploitation | Piggyback on apps already granted Full Disk Access | Write access to FDA app's bundle or plugin dir |
| Direct DB modification | Edit TCC.db to grant consent | SIP disabled or FDA |
| Inherited permissions | Child process inherits parent's TCC grants | Code execution in context of FDA-granted app |
| Automation abuse | Apple Events / osascript to control TCC-granted app | Automation permission (lower bar than direct TCC) |
| Mounting tricks | Mount a crafted disk image containing modified TCC.db | Local access, pre-Ventura |
| SQL injection in TCC | Malformed bundle IDs triggering SQL injection in TCC subsystem | CVE-2023-32364 and similar |
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 338 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A 28b2f8334fd7
macos-security-bypass is a skill published in the GitHub repository JustineDevs/premortem (2 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 3,369 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to macos-security-bypass, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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