403-bypass

403-bypass is a skill for Claude Code from kalpmodi/akira. It costs 90 tokens per session (15,881 once invoked), scanned F, original, MIT.

A security-testing guide for investigating HTTP 403 Forbidden responses, which mean a server is refusing access to a requested page or API endpoint.

In plain words
What is it for?
It is for authorized penetration tests and bug bounty work on restricted endpoints, administrative pages, and protected APIs, with evidence collected for a report.
Why use it?
It helps determine whether the refusal is a genuine access control or a misconfiguration between services such as a proxy, CDN, or web firewall.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin. Also seen: reads .claude/ paths; positional $N argument.

Needs its repository: it reads a path above its own folder, which exists only inside the repository. The line is PROTECTED=("../admin/config" "../etc/passwd" "../.env" "../config.php" "../admin").

Part of the akira plugin — 16 skills shipped together

Good fit It is for authorized penetration tests and bug bounty work on restricted endpoints, administrative pages, and protected APIs, with evidence collected for a report.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install

Getting it into your agent

It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kalpmodi/akira
agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/kalpmodi/akira/403-bypass

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install akira, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 16 skills.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for 403-bypass

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kalpmodi/akira/403-bypass/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/kalpmodi/akira/403-bypass)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kalpmodi/akira/403-bypass"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kalpmodi/akira/403-bypass/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for 403-bypass

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kalpmodi/akira/403-bypass"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kalpmodi/akira/403-bypass.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 90 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 15,881 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan F 4 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. ✓ AI security review Sonnet 5 · 7 Sept 2026 📄 Read the review
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00090 $0.15881
Opus 5 $0.00045 $0.07941
Sonnet 5 $0.00018 $0.03176
Haiku 4.5 $0.00009 $0.01588

Measured 9d ago against content hash c3678a0ccdbf, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-09, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade F, and why

403-bypass scanned grade F with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration

A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.

CODE=$(curl -sk -X POST "$TARGET" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$PAYLOAD" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}")

Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain

curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.

curl -sk "https://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=target.com/restricted&output=json&limit=5" | python3 -m json.tool

Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery

One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.

"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" # AWS metadata

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

curl -ski "https://target.com/restricted" -o /dev/null -w "HTTP: %{http_code} | Size: %{size_download} | Time: %{time_total}s\n"
skills/403-bypass/SKILL.md · 1,309 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,309 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

403 Bypass

Overview

A 403 doesn't always mean truly inaccessible. Misconfigured reverse proxies, CDNs, WAFs, and backend servers enforce access controls at different layers - creating parser-level gaps. This skill covers every known bypass class, from basic header tricks to conference-grade research techniques (DEF CON 2024, Black Hat 2024/2025, Orange Tsai's parser logic work, PortSwigger cache research).

Goal: Confirm whether a 403 is a hard block or a bypass-able misconfiguration, then document evidence for reporting.


Phase 0: Smart Intake

source ~/.claude/skills/_shared/phase0.sh
source ~/.claude/skills/_shared/signals.sh

p0_init_vars "$1"
p0_state_gate "HARVEST" || exit 0
p0_read_relay recon
p0_read_memory
p0_read_hypotheses

TECH_STACK=$KNOWN_TECH  # alias for downstream references

echo "=== PHASE 0 403-BYPASS INTAKE: $TARGET ==="
echo "State: $STATE | WAF: $WAF"
echo "Tech stack: $TECH_STACK"
echo "Target endpoints for bypass: $(echo "$INTERESTING_ENDPOINTS" | wc -l)"
echo "Top hypothesis: $TOP_HYPO_LABEL [$TOP_HYPO_PROB%]"
echo "ATW flagged (avoid): ${ATW_FLAGGED:-none}"

Execution Manifest

Build targeted manifest: one item per bypass technique class per target endpoint. Priority is determined by WAF type detected.

# WAF-to-priority mapping:
# Cloudflare  -> c02 (header), c05 (double-encode), c12 (automated), c17b (origin IP direct hit)
# Akamai      -> c10 (smuggling OPTIONS+line-folding CVE-2025-32094), c11 (cache deception), c02
# AWS WAF     -> c17 (ALB direct), c02 (header), c04 (path manipulation)
# Nginx+Apache-> c07 (path confusion CVE-2025-0108), c08 (off-by-slash), c15 (mod_proxy CVE-2024-38473)
# IIS         -> c18 (tilde enum + ADS), c22b (Apache ? bypass if applicable)
# unknown     -> c02, c04, c09, c12 (automated sweep)

MANIFEST=$(cat << 'MANIFEST_EOF'
{
  "phase": "403-bypass",
  "generated_at": "YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM",
  "items": [
    {"id":"b01","tool":"baseline","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"fingerprint WAF/CDN/server before trying anything","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"b02","tool":"header-bypass","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"X-Forwarded-For/X-Original-URL IP spoofing","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"b03","tool":"path-manipulation","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"encoding/case/extension tricks bypass string-match ACL","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"b04","tool":"hop-by-hop-strip","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"strip auth headers via Connection: header","priority":"SHOULD","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"b05","tool":"double-url-encoding","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"WAF decodes once, backend decodes twice (DEF CON 2024)","priority":"SHOULD","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"b06","tool":"method-fuzzing","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"ACL may only block GET, not PUT/POST/TRACE","priority":"SHOULD","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"b07","tool":"nomore403","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"330+ automated bypass techniques","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"b08","tool":"waf-specific-bypass","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"targeted technique for detected WAF type","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":"skip if WAF=unknown"},
    {"id":"b09","tool":"h2c-smuggling","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"h2c upgrade causes proxy to stop inspecting requests","priority":"IF_TIME","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"b10","tool":"prototype-pollution","target":"<403-endpoint>","reason":"Node.js/Express auth bypass via __proto__","priority":"IF_TIME","status":"pending","skip_reason":"skip if no Node.js in tech stack"}
  ]
}
MANIFEST_EOF
)

jq --argjson m "$MANIFEST" '.scalpel.active_manifest = $m' $SESSION > /tmp/s.json && mv /tmp/s.json $SESSION

Read the full file on GitHub · 1,309 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 9d ago First seen · 1,309 lines · 90 tokens per session scan F c3678a0ccdbf

Subscribe to this mod's changes

403-bypass is a skill published in the GitHub repository kalpmodi/akira (21 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 90 tokens to every session and 15,881 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it F with 4 findings (sends data to an external url, downloads and executes remote code, cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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