cloud-audit

cloud-audit is a skill for Claude Code from kalpmodi/akira. It costs 97 tokens per session (5,629 once invoked), scanned D, original, MIT.

A playbook for checking cloud infrastructure, such as AWS, Google Cloud, Azure, and Kubernetes, for security weaknesses and exposed credentials.

In plain words
What is it for?
Auditing cloud accounts, testing IAM or RBAC escalation, checking exposed storage and Kubernetes APIs, and investigating credential leaks or metadata-service access.
Why use it?
Cloud permissions, storage, identity settings, and management interfaces can expose data or allow attackers to gain more access. The playbook focuses testing on those areas and requires proof of real access.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin. Also seen: reads .claude/ paths; positional $N argument.

Part of the akira plugin — 16 skills shipped together

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/kalpmodi/akira/cloud-audit
Any agent
npx skills add kalpmodi/akira --skill cloud-audit
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kalpmodi/akira

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install akira, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 16 skills.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for cloud-audit

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kalpmodi/akira/cloud-audit.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/kalpmodi/akira/cloud-audit)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kalpmodi/akira/cloud-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kalpmodi/akira/cloud-audit.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 97 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 5,629 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan D 4 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00097 $0.05629
Opus 5 $0.00048 $0.02815
Sonnet 5 $0.00019 $0.01126
Haiku 4.5 $0.00010 $0.00563

Measured 6d ago against content hash 4f294c120f70, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-06, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade D, and why

cloud-audit scanned grade D with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation

SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.

-d "cmd=cat /etc/shadow"

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain

curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.

curl http://<etcd-ip>:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true | python3 -m json.tool | grep -i "secret\|token\|password"

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery

One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.

One SSRF to 169.254.169.254 = IAM creds = all S3 = all Secrets Manager = game over.

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

curl -sI https://<target> | grep -i "server\|via\|x-amz\|x-goog\|x-ms-"
skills/cloud-audit/SKILL.md · 518 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 518 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Cloud Infrastructure Audit Playbook

Philosophy

Cloud misconfigs are the highest-signal, lowest-effort findings in modern pentests. One SSRF to 169.254.169.254 = IAM creds = all S3 = all Secrets Manager = game over. Never claim "cloud compromise" without demonstrating actual data access with real credentials.

Arguments

<target> - domain or AWS account ID <focus> - optional: AWS / GCP / AZURE / K8S / FULL


Phase 0: Smart Intake

source ~/.claude/skills/_shared/phase0.sh
source ~/.claude/skills/_shared/signals.sh

p0_init_vars "$1"
p0_state_gate "HARVEST" || exit 0
p0_read_relay recon secrets exploit
p0_read_memory
p0_read_hypotheses

AWS_KEYS=$AWS_KEYS_FOUND  # alias to match downstream references

echo "=== PHASE 0 CLOUD-AUDIT INTAKE: $TARGET ==="
echo "State: $STATE"
echo "AWS keys found: $AWS_KEYS | SSRF vectors: $(echo "$SSRF_VECTORS" | wc -l)"
echo "AWS/GCP/Azure hints: $AWS_HINT/$GCP_HINT/$AZURE_HINT"
echo "ATW flagged (avoid): ${ATW_FLAGGED:-none}"

Execution Manifest

# Manifest is dynamic: only include phases for confirmed cloud providers
# MUST items = confirmed via prior intel. SHOULD = hinted. IF_TIME = speculative.

MANIFEST=$(cat << 'MANIFEST_EOF'
{
  "phase": "cloud-audit",
  "generated_at": "YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM",
  "items": [
    {"id":"c01","tool":"cloud-footprint-discovery","target":"<target>","reason":"identify cloud provider from DNS/headers","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"c02","tool":"s3-bucket-enum","target":"<target-brand>","reason":"find exposed S3/GCS/Azure blob buckets","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"c03","tool":"imds-ssrf","target":"<ssrf-endpoint-from-exploit-relay>","reason":"SSRF->IMDS credential theft if SSRF_VECTORS found","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":"set to skipped if no SSRF_VECTORS"},
    {"id":"c04","tool":"aws-iam-enum","target":"credentials from SSRF or secrets","reason":"enumerate IAM permissions, privesc paths","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":"set to skipped if no AWS credentials"},
    {"id":"c05","tool":"aws-data-exfil","target":"S3/SecretsManager/SSM/Lambda","reason":"extract actual sensitive data to prove impact","priority":"MUST","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"c06","tool":"gcp-metadata-enum","target":"<ssrf-endpoint>","reason":"GCP SA token via metadata if GCP_HINT=true","priority":"SHOULD","status":"pending","skip_reason":"skip if GCP_HINT=false"},
    {"id":"c07","tool":"azure-imds","target":"<ssrf-endpoint>","reason":"Azure managed identity token if AZURE_HINT=true","priority":"SHOULD","status":"pending","skip_reason":"skip if AZURE_HINT=false"},
    {"id":"c08","tool":"k8s-api-probe","target":"<live-hosts>:6443","reason":"exposed K8s API server","priority":"IF_TIME","status":"pending","skip_reason":null},
    {"id":"c09","tool":"cloud-misconfiguration-checklist","target":"<account>","reason":"IAM wildcard, SGgroups, CloudTrail disabled","priority":"SHOULD","status":"pending","skip_reason":null}
  ]
}
MANIFEST_EOF
)

jq --argjson m "$MANIFEST" '.scalpel.active_manifest = $m' $SESSION > /tmp/s.json && mv /tmp/s.json $SESSION

Read the full file on GitHub · 518 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 6d ago First seen · 518 lines · 97 tokens per session scan D 4f294c120f70

Subscribe to this mod's changes

cloud-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository kalpmodi/akira (21 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 97 tokens to every session and 5,629 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 4 findings (reaches for credential files, downloads and executes remote code, cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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