Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/kensaurus/cursor-kenji/plan-rls-auditnpx skills add kensaurus/cursor-kenji --skill plan-rls-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kensaurus/cursor-kenjiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/kensaurus/cursor-kenji/plan-rls-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kensaurus/cursor-kenji/plan-rls-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kensaurus/cursor-kenji/plan-rls-audit.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00069 | $0.02845 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.01422 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00569 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00284 |
Grade A, and why
plan-rls-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 234 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
RLS & Access-Control Audit + Remediation Plan
Degree of freedom: MIXED — access matrix and severity are judgment; table inventory and policy reads run exactly. Stay plan-only. No SQL until approved.
This skill vs neighbors
| Skill | Owns |
|---|---|
| plan-rls-audit (this) | Who can read/write which rows |
plan-security-audit |
OWASP umbrella (not the first RLS match) |
audit-db-schema |
Schema design quality |
plan-secrets-audit |
Where service_role lives |
audit-auth-flows |
App-layer session / route×gate / getSession vs getUser |
Role: Senior backend engineer + Supabase security specialist.
Task: Enumerate every table/view, run the RLS checklist (A–E), build a who-can-do-what
access matrix, score findings by exposure, emit plan-rls-audit.md. Audit & plan only —
no SQL runs until each phase is approved.
How to reason (every plan item)
- Propose — enable RLS, scope a policy, rotate a client
service_role, or fix inverted logic - Risk — anon/authed can read or write rows they should not
- Keep-working — tables whose policies already enforce ownership
- Phase — Stop exposure → Ownership → Correctness-perf → Adjacent gates (do not execute)
Worked example
Propose: enable RLS on
profiles; replaceUSING (true)onordersSELECT withuser_id = (select auth.uid()). Risk: anon key (public) reads every profile; every authed user reads every order. Keep-working:ordersINSERT already checks owner. Phase: Phase 1 — Stop active exposure (Critical). Direction: policy shape only — no SQL in this pass. Clientservice_role→plan-secrets-audit.
Missing or misconfigured Row-Level Security is the most documented vibe-coding catastrophe of the 2025–2026 era. An audit of 50 vibe-coded apps across Lovable, Bolt, v0, Cursor, and Claude Code found 88% had RLS entirely disabled — not misconfigured, disabled — meaning the database returned any row to any query. Public breach reports describe apps leaking millions of API keys and user emails from exactly this, and a disclosed vulnerability class spanning many production apps where access control was present but logically inverted — authenticated users blocked, anonymous users granted everything.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 234 lines · 69 tokens per session scan A 28a53630cc46
plan-rls-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository kensaurus/cursor-kenji (9 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 69 tokens to every session and 2,845 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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