Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh --skill analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malwaregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zhWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.01897 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00949 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00379 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00190 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 186 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
分析恶意软件中的网络隐蔽信道
概述
恶意软件使用隐蔽信道将 C2 通信和数据泄露伪装成看似合法的网络流量。DNS 隧道将数据编码在 DNS 查询和响应中(iodine、dnscat2 等工具和 FrameworkPOS 等恶意软件家族均使用此技术)。ICMP 隧道将数据隐藏在回显请求/响应载荷中(icmpsh、ptunnel)。HTTP 隐蔽信道将 C2 数据嵌入头部、Cookie 或隐写图像中。协议滥用利用允许的协议绕过防火墙。现代基于机器学习的方法对 DNS 隧道检测可达 99% 以上的召回率,但低吞吐量泄露仍然具有挑战性。Palo Alto Unit42 在 2024 年跟踪了三个主要的 DNS 隧道活动(TrkCdn、SecShow、Savvy Seahorse),显示了该技术的持续普遍性。
前置条件
- Python 3.9+,安装
scapy、dpkt、dnslib - Wireshark/tshark,用于 PCAP 分析
- Zeek(原 Bro),用于网络监控
- DNS 查询日志基础设施
- 对 DNS、ICMP、HTTP 协议的数据包级理解
操作步骤
步骤 1:DNS 隧道检测
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""检测网络流量中的 DNS 隧道和隐蔽信道。"""
import sys
import json
import math
from collections import Counter, defaultdict
try:
from scapy.all import rdpcap, DNS, DNSQR, DNSRR, IP, ICMP
except ImportError:
print("pip install scapy")
sys.exit(1)
def entropy(data):
if not data:
return 0
freq = Counter(data)
length = len(data)
return -sum((c/length) * math.log2(c/length) for c in freq.values())
def analyze_dns_tunneling(pcap_path):
"""检测 PCAP 中的 DNS 隧道指标。"""
packets = rdpcap(pcap_path)
domain_stats = defaultdict(lambda: {
"queries": 0, "total_qname_len": 0, "subdomain_lengths": [],
"query_types": Counter(), "unique_subdomains": set(),
})
for pkt in packets:
if pkt.haslayer(DNS) and pkt.haslayer(DNSQR):
qname = pkt[DNSQR].qname.decode('utf-8', errors='replace').rstrip('.')
qtype = pkt[DNSQR].qtype
parts = qname.split('.')
if len(parts) >= 3:
base_domain = '.'.join(parts[-2:])
subdomain = '.'.join(parts[:-2])
stats = domain_stats[base_domain]
stats["queries"] += 1
stats["total_qname_len"] += len(qname)
stats["subdomain_lengths"].append(len(subdomain))
stats["query_types"][qtype] += 1
stats["unique_subdomains"].add(subdomain)
# 对域名进行隧道指标评分
suspicious = []
for domain, stats in domain_stats.items():
if stats["queries"] < 5:
continue
avg_subdomain_len = (sum(stats["subdomain_lengths"]) /
len(stats["subdomain_lengths"]))
unique_ratio = len(stats["unique_subdomains"]) / stats["queries"]
# 计算子域名熵
all_subdomains = ''.join(stats["unique_subdomains"])
sub_entropy = entropy(all_subdomains)
score = 0
reasons = []
if avg_subdomain_len > 30:
score += 30
reasons.append(f"子域名过长(平均 {avg_subdomain_len:.0f} 字符)")
if unique_ratio > 0.9:
score += 25
reasons.append(f"唯一性高({unique_ratio:.2%})")
if sub_entropy > 4.0:
score += 25
reasons.append(f"熵值高({sub_entropy:.2f})")
if stats["query_types"].get(16, 0) > 10: # TXT 记录
score += 20
reasons.append(f"大量 TXT 查询({stats['query_types'][16]} 次)")
if score >= 50:
suspicious.append({
"domain": domain,
"score": score,
"queries": stats["queries"],
"avg_subdomain_length": round(avg_subdomain_len, 1),
"unique_subdomains": len(stats["unique_subdomains"]),
"subdomain_entropy": round(sub_entropy, 2),
"reasons": reasons,
})
return sorted(suspicious, key=lambda x: -x["score"])
def analyze_icmp_tunneling(pcap_path):
"""检测 PCAP 中的 ICMP 隧道。"""
packets = rdpcap(pcap_path)
icmp_stats = defaultdict(lambda: {"count": 0, "payload_sizes": [], "payloads": []})
for pkt in packets:
if pkt.haslayer(ICMP) and pkt.haslayer(IP):
src = pkt[IP].src
dst = pkt[IP].dst
key = f"{src}->{dst}"
payload = bytes(pkt[ICMP].payload)
icmp_stats[key]["count"] += 1
icmp_stats[key]["payload_sizes"].append(len(payload))
if len(payload) > 64:
icmp_stats[key]["payloads"].append(payload[:100])
suspicious = []
for flow, stats in icmp_stats.items():
if stats["count"] < 5:
continue
avg_size = sum(stats["payload_sizes"]) / len(stats["payload_sizes"])
if avg_size > 64 or stats["count"] > 100:
suspicious.append({
"flow": flow,
"packets": stats["count"],
"avg_payload_size": round(avg_size, 1),
"reason": "大型/频繁的 ICMP 载荷表明存在隧道",
})
return suspicious
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print(f"用法:{sys.argv[0]} <pcap_file>")
sys.exit(1)
print("[+] DNS 隧道分析")
dns_results = analyze_dns_tunneling(sys.argv[1])
for r in dns_results:
print(f" {r['domain']}(评分:{r['score']})")
for reason in r['reasons']:
print(f" - {reason}")
print("\n[+] ICMP 隧道分析")
icmp_results = analyze_icmp_tunneling(sys.argv[1])
for r in icmp_results:
print(f" {r['flow']}:{r['reason']}")
What ships with it
6 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 186 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A e556a1fa00ac
analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware is a skill published in the GitHub repository killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh (44 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 1,897 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware
Detect and analyze covert communication channels used by malware, including DNS tunneling, ICMP exfiltration, steganographic HTTP, and other protocol abuse used for C2 and data exfiltration. Use when investigating suspicious DNS/ICMP/HTTP traffic patterns, hunting for hidden C2 channels in network captures, or…
analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware
Detect and analyze covert communication channels used by malware including DNS tunneling, ICMP exfiltration, steganographic HTTP, and protocol abuse for C2 and data exfiltration.
analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware
Detect and analyze covert communication channels used by malware including DNS tunneling, ICMP exfiltration, steganographic HTTP, and protocol abuse for C2 and data exfiltration.
analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware
Detect and analyze covert communication channels used by malware including DNS tunneling, ICMP exfiltration, steganographic HTTP, and protocol abuse for C2 and data exfiltration.
analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware
Detect and analyze covert communication channels used by malware including DNS tunneling, ICMP exfiltration, steganographic HTTP, and protocol abuse for C2 and data exfiltration.
analyzing-network-covert-channels-in-malware
Detect and analyze covert communication channels used by malware including DNS tunneling, ICMP exfiltration, steganographic HTTP, and protocol abuse for C2 and data exfiltration.