Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Kin9Zeus/senior-engineer-skills --skill ai-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Kin9Zeus/senior-engineer-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/ai-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/ai-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/ai-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/ai-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kin9zeus/senior-engineer-skills/ai-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00225 | $0.02682 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00090 | $0.01073 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00045 | $0.00536 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00268 |
Grade A, and why
ai-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 207 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AI Security
A language model cannot reliably tell instructions from data. Everything below follows from that one fact: any text the model reads can steer it, and anything the model can do, an attacker who controls that text can try to do.
Two threats are current and concrete: attacks on the AI feature itself
(prompt injection, over-powered agents) and attacks on the keys and accounts
behind it — AI-provider keys are monetisable on sight, and platform breaches have
been reported to target AI inference providers specifically (see
security-incident-response).
Scope: AI features in software the user owns or is authorised to assess. Testing prompts against the user's own application is in scope; attacking third-party AI services or other people's deployments is not.
Taxonomies change. The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications is the maintained reference — check its current edition rather than quoting category numbers from memory.
1 · The order of work
1 INVENTORY every model call, tool, data source, MCP server, plugin; where each key lives
2 KEYS & SPEND provider keys scoped, per-environment, capped, monitored
3 AGENCY what can the AI do? reduce it to what it needs; gate the irreversible
4 DATA FLOWS find the three-way overlap (below); break at least one leg
5 INPUT PATHS every place untrusted text reaches the model (users, web, files, email, tool results, RAG)
6 OUTPUT treat model output as untrusted input to the rest of the system
7 ISOLATION tenants, memory, vector stores, conversation history
8 SUPPLY CHAIN models, plugins, MCP servers, skills, prompt files — all of it is code
9 TEST & WATCH red-team your own app; regression evals; alert on abuse
2 · The three-way overlap that makes exfiltration possible
An AI feature is in serious danger when one session combines all three:
- Access to private data (user data, secrets, internal documents)
- Exposure to untrusted content (web pages, emails, uploaded files, issue text, retrieved documents, other users' input)
- A way to communicate externally (HTTP requests, email, rendering images or links, writing to a shared place)
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 207 lines · 225 tokens per session scan A 207f43471e62
ai-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository Kin9Zeus/senior-engineer-skills (3 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 225 tokens to every session and 2,682 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-24.
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