SAVVYDFIR-MCP: Skill for Claude Code

.claude/skills/pivot-methodology/SKILL.md

pivot-methodology is a skill for Claude Code from kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCP. It costs 37 tokens per session (1,098 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

An investigation guide that shows what evidence to examine next after finding a suspicious process, network connection, or other forensic clue.

In plain words
What is it for?
It helps trace processes to injected code, loaded libraries, network activity, execution records, file hashes, deleted files, timelines, and possible malware indicators.
Why use it?
It prevents investigations from stopping at the first finding and provides a repeatable way to connect related evidence.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: allowed-tools in frontmatter.

This is kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCP's own configuration. It tells Claude Code how to work on SAVVYDFIR-MCP itself, so it is not a mod to install elsewhere. Copy it as a starting point and replace the rules that are about this project. Everything SAVVYDFIR-MCP configures →

Reuse

Borrowing it

Nothing to install: this file belongs to kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCP. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.

Copy the file
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCP/master/.claude/skills/pivot-methodology/SKILL.md
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCP

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for pivot-methodology

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/pivot-methodology/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/pivot-methodology)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/pivot-methodology"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/pivot-methodology/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for pivot-methodology

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/pivot-methodology"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/pivot-methodology.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 37 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,098 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00037 $0.01098
Opus 5 $0.00018 $0.00549
Sonnet 5 $0.00007 $0.00220
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00110

Measured 11d ago against content hash a2a58dd81e44, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-11, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

pivot-methodology scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/skills/pivot-methodology/SKILL.md · 99 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 99 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Pivot Methodology - Universal Investigation Chains

From a Suspicious Process

Process (PID, name, path)
  ├── detect_injection(pid=PID)      → Check for code injection
  ├── list_dlls(pid=PID)             → Check loaded DLLs
  ├── scan_network(dump_path)        → Filter connections by PID
  ├── extract_prefetch()             → Find .PF file for execution proof
  ├── get_amcache()                  → Get SHA-1 hash of binary
  └── list_deleted_files()           → Check if binary was deleted after execution

From a Network Connection

Connection (remote_ip, remote_port, PID)
  ├── Look up owning process via PID  → What binary is talking?
  ├── detect_injection(pid=PID)       → Is the process injected?
  ├── Timeline query around timestamp  → What else happened at this time?
  ├── YARA scan memory for C2 sigs    → Known malware family?
  └── Check other connections to same IP → How many hosts are beaconing?

From a Prefetch Entry

Prefetch (executable_name, run_count, last_run_times)
  ├── Is the binary still on disk?    → fls or ls
  │   ├── YES → sha256sum + check VirusTotal
  │   └── NO  → Attacker cleaned up (check deleted files + amcache SHA-1)
  ├── What DLLs did it reference?     → referenced_files in prefetch
  ├── What user ran it?               → Correlate with Event 4688 at same timestamp
  └── Timeline around first_run_time  → What happened just before execution?

From a Registry Persistence Key

Registry Key (path, value_data)
  ├── Does the binary in value_data exist on disk?
  │   ├── YES → Hash it, check amcache, check if it was timestomped
  │   └── NO  → Binary deleted but persistence remains (compromised + partial cleanup)
  ├── When was the key last written?  → Correlate with timeline
  ├── Who created it?                 → Check Event 4657 (registry audit) or 4688
  └── What type of persistence?       → Map to ATT&CK: T1547, T1053, T1543, etc.

From a Deleted File

Deleted File (path, inode, size)
  ├── extract_prefetch()              → Was the deleted file ever executed?
  ├── get_amcache()                   → SHA-1 hash survived deletion?
  ├── extract_mft_timeline()          → When was it created? Modified? Deleted?
  ├── icat to extract content         → Recover the file for analysis
  └── YARA scan the extracted file    → Known malware signature?

Read the full file on GitHub · 99 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 11d ago First seen · 99 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A a2a58dd81e44

Subscribe to this mod's changes

pivot-methodology is a skill published in the GitHub repository kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCP (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 1,098 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.

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