Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCP. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCP/master/.claude/skills/tools-reference/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCPWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/tools-reference)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/tools-reference"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/tools-reference/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/tools-reference"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kismatkunwar89/savvydfir-mcp/tools-reference.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.01327 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00664 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00265 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00133 |
Grade A, and why
tools-reference scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 128 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Tools Reference - Exact Command Syntax
Volatility 3 (Memory Analysis)
MEM=/evidence/memory/extracted/dump.raw
# Process analysis
vol3 -f $MEM windows.pslist # Running processes (EPROCESS list walk)
vol3 -f $MEM windows.psscan # All processes (pool tag scan - finds hidden)
vol3 -f $MEM windows.pstree # Process tree with parent-child
vol3 -f $MEM windows.cmdline # Command lines per process
# Network
vol3 -f $MEM windows.netscan # Active + recently closed connections
vol3 -f $MEM windows.netstat # Current connections
# Injection detection
vol3 -f $MEM windows.malfind # All suspicious VAD regions
vol3 -f $MEM windows.malfind --pid PID # Specific process
vol3 -f $MEM windows.vadinfo --pid PID # Full VAD details
# DLLs and handles
vol3 -f $MEM windows.dlllist --pid PID # Loaded DLLs
vol3 -f $MEM windows.handles --pid PID # Open handles
# Credentials
vol3 -f $MEM windows.hashdump # SAM database hashes
vol3 -f $MEM windows.lsadump # LSA secrets
# YARA in memory
vol3 -f $MEM yarascan.YaraScan --yara-file /path/to/rules.yar
vol3 -f $MEM yarascan.YaraScan --yara-file /path/to/rules.yar --pid PID
Sleuth Kit (Disk Analysis)
# Mount E01
mkdir -p /mnt/evidence /mnt/disk
ewfmount /evidence/disk/image.E01 /mnt/evidence/
mmls /mnt/evidence/ewf1 # Get partition offsets
OFFSET=2048 # Replace with actual NTFS offset
mount -o ro,loop,offset=$((OFFSET*512)) /mnt/evidence/ewf1 /mnt/disk/
# List files
fls -r -p /mnt/evidence/ewf1 -o $OFFSET | head -100 # All files
fls -r -p -d /mnt/evidence/ewf1 -o $OFFSET # Deleted only
# Extract by inode
icat -o $OFFSET /mnt/evidence/ewf1 INODE > /cases/extracted_file
# Filesystem stats
fsstat -o $OFFSET /mnt/evidence/ewf1
# Extract $MFT (always inode 0)
icat -o $OFFSET /mnt/evidence/ewf1 0 > /cases/mft/\$MFT
EZ Tools (Windows Artifact Parsing)
# MFT parsing
MFTECmd -f /cases/mft/\$MFT --csv /cases/mft/ --csvf mft_output.csv
# Event log parsing
EvtxECmd -f /mnt/disk/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/Security.evtx --csv /cases/evtx/ --csvf security.csv
EvtxECmd -d /mnt/disk/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/ --csv /cases/evtx/ --csvf all_logs.csv
# Prefetch
PECmd -d /mnt/disk/Windows/Prefetch/ --csv /cases/prefetch/ --csvf prefetch.csv
# Application Compatibility Cache
AppCompatCacheParser -f /mnt/disk/Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM --csv /cases/shimcache/ --csvf shimcache.csv
# LNK files
LECmd -d /mnt/disk/Users/ --csv /cases/lnk/ --csvf lnk.csv -q
# Jump Lists
JLECmd -d /mnt/disk/Users/ --csv /cases/jumplists/ --csvf jumplists.csv -q
# ShellBags
SBECmd -d /mnt/disk/Users/ --csv /cases/shellbags/ --csvf shellbags.csv
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 128 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A 827095182a52
tools-reference is a skill published in the GitHub repository kismatkunwar89/SAVVYDFIR-MCP (4 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 1,327 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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