Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/lftpadilla/agent-dev-kit/security-checklistnpx skills add LFTPadilla/agent-dev-kit --skill security-checklistgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/LFTPadilla/agent-dev-kitWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00067 | $0.00600 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00300 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00120 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00060 |
Grade A, and why
security-checklist scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
| `fetch(userProvidedUrl)` (SSRF) | HIGH | Allowlist hosts; block internal IPs | How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 46 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
security-checklist — pattern review for trust boundaries
The reasoning layer of security review. Pair with the semgrep skill: semgrep
is deterministic (never misses a known pattern), this catches the contextual
issues a static rule can't see. Adapted from ECC (github.com/affaan-m/ECC), MIT
— see ATTRIBUTION.md.
Flag-on-sight table
| Pattern | Severity | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Hardcoded secret / key / token | CRITICAL | process.env, rotate if committed |
| String-concatenated SQL | CRITICAL | Parameterized query / $1 placeholders |
| Shell command with user input | CRITICAL | execFile / arg arrays, never string interp |
| Plaintext password compare | CRITICAL | bcrypt.compare / argon2 |
| No auth check on protected route | CRITICAL | Auth middleware; verify per-route |
| Balance/quota check without lock | CRITICAL | SELECT ... FOR UPDATE in a transaction |
innerHTML = userInput |
HIGH | textContent or DOMPurify |
fetch(userProvidedUrl) (SSRF) |
HIGH | Allowlist hosts; block internal IPs |
| Cross-tenant / cross-user access | HIGH | Scope every query by owner id |
| Error detail leaked to client | MEDIUM | Generic message out, detail to logs only |
| Secret / PII in logs or Sentry | MEDIUM | Redact before logging |
| No rate limit on public endpoint | HIGH | Throttle (per-IP / per-user) |
Process
- Scope to the diff at a trust boundary (auth, payments, input, uploads, webhooks).
- Walk the table; for each hit cite
file:line, the trigger, and the fix. - Cross-check with
semgrep --config p/owasp-top-ten p/secrets— deterministic backstop. - Backend-first: a security gap fixed only in the frontend is still open — flag until the server enforces it.
Skip these (common false positives)
- Vars in
.env.example— placeholders, not secrets. - Test credentials clearly inside test files.
- Keys meant to be public (publishable client keys).
- SHA256/MD5 used for checksums, not passwords.
Math.random()in non-crypto contexts (animation, jitter, sampling).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 46 lines · 67 tokens per session scan A 9aae7efd580f
security-checklist is a skill published in the GitHub repository LFTPadilla/agent-dev-kit (2 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 600 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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