Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill china-cyber-espionagegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00071 | $0.02877 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01438 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00575 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00288 |
Grade A, and why
china-cyber-espionage scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 13d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 138 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
China Cyber Espionage Knowledge Cell
Executive Summary
China operates the most extensive state-sponsored cyber espionage apparatus globally, with operations conducted primarily by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). MSS-affiliated groups such as APT41, APT10, and APT31 focus on intellectual property theft, technology acquisition, and political espionage aligned with national strategic priorities including the Made in China 2025 initiative. PLA-affiliated groups, most notably Volt Typhoon, have shifted toward pre-positioning in critical infrastructure networks, representing an evolution from traditional espionage toward operational preparation for potential future conflict scenarios.
A defining characteristic of Chinese cyber operations is the blurring of lines between state-directed espionage and financially motivated cybercrime. APT41 exemplifies this dual-purpose model, conducting espionage operations on behalf of the MSS while simultaneously pursuing financially motivated intrusions including ransomware deployment and cryptocurrency theft. This complicates attribution and response. Chinese operators have increasingly adopted living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques, abusing legitimate system tools and signed binaries to evade detection, a trend most prominently associated with Volt Typhoon's infiltration of U.S. critical infrastructure.
The 2023-2025 period saw significant escalation in Chinese cyber operations targeting telecommunications infrastructure. Salt Typhoon's compromise of major U.S. telecom providers exposed lawful intercept systems and call detail records of senior government officials, representing one of the most consequential intelligence collection operations in recent years. Concurrently, Mustang Panda continued aggressive targeting of government and diplomatic entities across Southeast Asia, reflecting Beijing's geopolitical priorities in the South China Sea region.
Key Actors
| Threat Actor | Aliases | Attribution | Primary Targets | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| APT41 | Winnti, Wicked Panda, Barium, Double Dragon | MSS (Chengdu) | Technology, gaming, healthcare, telecom | Active |
| APT10 | Stone Panda, MenuPass, Red Apollo | MSS (Tianjin) | MSPs, technology, aerospace, defense | Active |
| APT31 | Zirconium, Judgment Panda, Violet Typhoon | MSS (Wuhan) | Government, political entities, democracy activists | Active |
| Volt Typhoon | Bronze Silhouette, Vanguard Panda, DEV-0391 | PLA | U.S. critical infrastructure (energy, water, comms, transport) | Active |
| Salt Typhoon | GhostEmperor, FamousSparrow | MSS-linked | Telecommunications providers | Active |
| Mustang Panda | Bronze President, RedDelta, Earth Preta, Stately Taurus | MSS-linked | Government, NGOs (Southeast Asia, Europe) | Active |
| APT27 | Emissary Panda, Lucky Mouse, Iron Tiger, Budworm | MSS | Defense, technology, government | Active |
| APT3 | Gothic Panda, Buckeye, UPS Team | MSS (Guangdong) | Defense, aerospace, technology | Reduced activity |
| Hafnium | Silk Typhoon | MSS-linked | Email infrastructure, Exchange servers | Active |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 13d ago First seen · 138 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A d2e5bd3666d9
china-cyber-espionage is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (18 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 2,877 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
ai-ad-copy-compliance-review
A risk-review assistant for advertising and sales copy. It examines provided material for possible concerns and suggests actions.
ai-agent-browser
A business-diagnosis assistant for marketing, operations, product, and sales questions. It breaks down a goal and produces a summary, findings, action suggestions, and reusable deliverables.
ai-article
A Chinese-language assistant for turning source material into article and content-operation deliverables. It is aimed at creators, marketers, technical teams, and media publishers.
ai-brand-voice-review
A business-diagnosis assistant for marketing, operations, services, and sales questions.
ai-browser-use
A business-diagnosis assistant for marketing, operations, product, and sales questions about how to approach a task.
ai-content-material-audit
A Chinese-language copy-review assistant for creators, marketers, operators, and media teams.