Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill china-cyber-espionagegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/china-cyber-espionage.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00071 | $0.07225 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00028 | $0.02890 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.01445 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00722 |
Grade C, and why
china-cyber-espionage scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Harvests environment variableshighData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
The actors modify router access control lists, open SSH on non-standard ports, run tooling in Cisco Guest Shell containers, and capture TACACS+ and RADIUS traffic to harvest credentials [9]. Sources differ on initial acc How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 218 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
China Cyber Espionage Knowledge Cell
Executive Summary
China operates the most extensive state-sponsored cyber espionage apparatus globally. Operations are tasked primarily by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) also named as a customer in U.S. indictments. Since 2025 the public record has shifted from describing discrete "APT groups" to describing an ecosystem: government advisories, sanctions and indictments now name the private companies that build tooling, run infrastructure and sell stolen data to the state. Named firms include i-Soon, Integrity Technology Group, Shanghai Heiying, Sichuan Juxinhe, Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie [9][10][11][12][22]. One consequence is that vendor cluster names no longer map cleanly onto organisations, and sources disagree on several mappings (see Key Actors).
Two strategic lines of effort remain active. The first is espionage against communications infrastructure: the activity tracked as Salt Typhoon was described in August 2025 by agencies from 13 countries as a global campaign running since at least 2021 against telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging and military networks [9]. European governments continued to disclose compromises into 2026 [26][27]. The second is pre-positioning in critical infrastructure, associated with Volt Typhoon. U.S. advisories attribute Volt Typhoon to PRC state-sponsored actors without naming a service [1]. The Wall Street Journal reported in April 2025 that Chinese officials indirectly acknowledged the activity in a December 2024 meeting in Geneva, in remarks U.S. officials read as linked to U.S. support for Taiwan [30].
Tradecraft has converged on the network edge and on systems that cannot run endpoint detection. The 2025-2026 record is dominated by exploitation of VPN, firewall, router and email appliances, by backdoors placed on VMware vCenter and ESXi hosts with dwell times averaging over a year [17][18], by abuse of stolen credentials, API keys and OAuth applications to reach downstream customers of IT providers [13], and by covert networks of compromised SOHO and IoT devices that a 15-agency advisory in April 2026 said the majority of China-nexus actors now use [22]. CrowdStrike reported a 38% rise in China-nexus activity in 2025 [32]. In November 2025 Anthropic reported the first documented espionage campaign in which an AI model carried out most of the intrusion work, attributed with high confidence to a Chinese state-sponsored group [20].
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +80 lines scan A → C 9c75cbf0af97
- 2mo ago First seen · 138 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A d2e5bd3666d9
china-cyber-espionage is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 7,225 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (harvests environment variables). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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