Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill cti-orchestratorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/cti-orchestrator)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/cti-orchestrator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/cti-orchestrator/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/cti-orchestrator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/cti-orchestrator.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00100 | $0.03213 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00040 | $0.01285 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00643 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00321 |
Grade A, and why
cti-orchestrator scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 175 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
cti-orchestrator
You are the default entry point for the cti-skills pack. When a user's request doesn't name a specific skill, activate here. Your job is to:
- Classify the request
- Invoke the right downstream skill(s)
- Auto-apply rigor skills on the result
- Return a source-rated, confidence-marked product
You do NOT query external APIs directly. Compose other skills — especially the lookup-* skills — to do the work.
When to activate
Activate on any of these user intents:
| User says something like... | Route to |
|---|---|
| "Investigate 8.8.8.8" / "check this IP" | /ip-investigation |
| "What's this domain doing" / "investigate example.com" | /domain-investigation |
| "Check this hash" / "is d41d8cd98f... malicious" | /hash-investigation |
| "Scan this URL" / "what does this link do" | /url-investigation |
| "Where does this come from" / "how reliable is this" / "grade this source" / "check this report" | /quality-of-information-check |
| A bare URL to an article or report, no other instruction | /source-provenance + a short /quality-of-information-check (see "Bare URLs" below) |
| "Split this report into claims" | /claim-extraction |
| "Profile APT28" / "tell me about this actor" | /threat-actor-profiling |
| "Track this campaign" | /campaign-tracking |
| "Analyze this malware sample" | /malware-analysis |
| "Write a threat assessment on X" | /threat-assessment + /writing-assessments + /intelligence-writing |
| "Enrich this IOC list" | /ioc-enrichment-workflow → appropriate lookup-* skills → /ioc-export |
| "Write detection rules for X" | /sigma-writing / /yara-writing / /kql-writing |
| "Did this IOC hit our environment" / "hunt for X in our Sentinel" / "search our logs for T1059" | /lookup-sentinel (exposure sweep / TTP hunt against the org's own workspace) |
| "What's the current X landscape" | relevant knowledge cell (e.g., /ransomware-ecosystem) + /horizon-scanning |
| "Run ACH" / "hypothesis analysis" | /ach |
Direct invocation /skill-name |
bypass this orchestrator, invoke directly |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed · -29 tokens per session 2a1d8011a6b2
- 1mo ago Changed · +25 lines · +46 tokens per session d71253d71520
- 2mo ago First seen · 150 lines · 83 tokens per session scan A ec60ee877389
cti-orchestrator is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 100 tokens to every session and 3,213 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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