Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill dprk-cyber-espionagegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/dprk-cyber-espionage)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/dprk-cyber-espionage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/dprk-cyber-espionage/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/dprk-cyber-espionage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/dprk-cyber-espionage.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.07564 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00030 | $0.03026 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.01513 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00756 |
Grade A, and why
dprk-cyber-espionage scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 227 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
DPRK Cyber Espionage Knowledge Cell
Executive Summary
North Korea operates a uniquely structured cyber program where revenue generation and intelligence collection are equally prioritized national objectives. Most units sit under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB); Japanese and U.S. authorities assess that the Contagious Interview (WaterPlum) operators and some IT workers instead operate under the 313 General Bureau of the Munitions Industry Department [24]. Chainalysis puts cumulative DPRK cryptocurrency theft at $6.75 billion through the end of 2025 [11]. The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), which replaced the disbanded UN Panel of Experts as the main multilateral reporting body, published its first cyber and IT-worker report in October 2025 [16].
2025 was the largest year on record: Chainalysis attributes $2.02 billion in theft to the DPRK, a 51% increase on 2024 from far fewer known incidents, dominated by the $1.5 billion Bybit theft of February 2025 that the FBI attributed to TraderTraitor [9][11]. 2026 has continued at a lower but still high level. The April 2026 Drift Protocol (about $285 million) and KelpDAO (about $290 million) thefts and the 24 September 2026 Bitget theft ($351.6 million) are all assessed by blockchain analytics firms or the victims as likely DPRK operations, though none has yet been formally attributed by a government. If Bitget is confirmed, 2026 theft exceeds $1 billion [19][20][21][22][23].
Three trends define the period since early 2025. First, developer and open-source targeting has become the main access route: the Contagious Interview fake-interview campaign infected at least 30,000 devices in more than 100 countries between December 2025 and July 2026, and the March 2026 compromise of the axios npm package showed that DPRK operators can hijack packages with more than 100 million weekly downloads [17][18][24]. Second, the IT-worker scheme has drawn sustained enforcement (a coordinated U.S. action in June 2025, sanctions in March 2026, multinational alerts in July and September 2026) while expanding beyond the United States and adopting AI tools for identity fraud [13][14][15][24]. Third, espionage units continue to invest in capability: Lazarus used a Windows zero-day in its 2026 Operation Dream Job wave against defense firms, and Kimsuky compromised South Korean software vendors to reach their customers [26][27].
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +85 lines 36a2a238a80c
- 2mo ago First seen · 142 lines · 75 tokens per session scan A 2d40063715ea
dprk-cyber-espionage is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 7,564 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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