Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill hacktivismgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/hacktivism)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/hacktivism"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/hacktivism/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/hacktivism"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/hacktivism.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00072 | $0.07307 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00029 | $0.02923 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.01461 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00731 |
Grade A, and why
hacktivism scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 205 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Hacktivism
Executive Summary
Hacktivism in 2025-2026 is driven by two conflicts: Russia's war against Ukraine and the confrontation between Iran, Israel and the United States. Activity tracks military and political events closely. Radware recorded a peak in public DDoS claims in Q2 2025, a contraction afterwards, and a 103% month-over-month jump in March 2026 following the US and Israeli strikes on Iran that began on 28 February 2026 [19][20]. Europe receives roughly half of all claimed hacktivist DDoS attacks, and government is the most targeted sector [19][20].
The question of whether the main pro-Russian brands are grassroots or state-run has largely been answered by governments. In December 2025 the US Department of Justice and a joint advisory from CISA, FBI, NSA and international partners stated that Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR) was created and funded by the GRU, and that NoName057(16) was created by CISM, an organization established on behalf of the Kremlin [11][12]. Denmark's Defence Intelligence Service assessed that Z-Pentest and NoName057(16) both have links to the Russian state and are used as instruments of hybrid war [13]. On the Iranian side, vendors describe Handala as linked to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Cyber Av3ngers as affiliated with the IRGC [17][23].
Law-enforcement pressure increased but has not stopped the activity. Europol's Operation Eastwood (July 2025) took more than 100 NoName057(16) servers offline and produced two arrests and seven arrest warrants; Imperva measured a few days of silence followed by a higher attack tempo [9][10]. NoName057(16) remained the most active DDoS-claiming group through the first half of 2026 [19]. The United States extradited and indicted one alleged CARR and NoName057(16) participant, Spain arrested an alleged supporter, and Dutch investigators seized 800 servers from hosting companies linked to the group's infrastructure [11][14][15].
Most hacktivist operations still have limited effect, and the groups routinely exaggerate. The joint advisory says pro-Russian groups have limited capabilities and regularly make false or exaggerated claims [12]. The exception is tampering with internet-exposed operational technology (OT). Confirmed cases now include burst water pipes in Denmark, a dam valve opened in Norway, and manipulated water pressure in Canada, all achieved through weak or default credentials rather than sophisticated tooling [13][21][22]. Anonymous Sudan remains disrupted following the October 2024 US indictment; no later activity was found in this refresh.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +80 lines f2a3ce29bbbd
- 2mo ago First seen · 125 lines · 72 tokens per session scan A e49a63120bc1
hacktivism is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 72 tokens to every session and 7,307 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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