Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/indicator-pivotingWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/indicator-pivoting)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/indicator-pivoting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/indicator-pivoting/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/indicator-pivoting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/indicator-pivoting.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00103 | $0.06359 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00041 | $0.02544 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.01272 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00636 |
Grade A, and why
indicator-pivoting scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 427 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Indicator Pivoting
Pivoting is the art of using one known indicator to discover related infrastructure, expanding a single seed into an understanding of an adversary's wider operations. Each pivot is a directed-graph walk: the node is an indicator (typed), the edge is a relation derived from a lookup, and the cost is one or more API calls plus the analyst time to interpret the result.
This skill is the canonical "how to walk the IOC graph" reference. The four investigation skills (/ip-investigation, /domain-investigation, /hash-investigation, /url-investigation) chain a fixed set of lookups for a known seed type; this skill takes over when you need to keep walking past their first-hop output.
This skill invokes: /lookup-liberty91, /lookup-virustotal, /lookup-otx, /lookup-shodan, /lookup-censys, /lookup-urlscan, /lookup-abuseipdb, /lookup-greynoise, /lookup-misp, /lookup-opencti, /lookup-ransomwarelive, /lookup-crowdstrike, /lookup-reversinglabs; then /score-source, /apply-tlp, /confidence-language. May hand off to /threat-actor-profiling, /campaign-tracking, /malware-analysis, /yara-writing, /sigma-writing, /darkweb-collection.
When to invoke
- The user has a single seed IOC and asks "what else is related to this?"
- An investigation skill returned
pivot_candidatesand you need to walk further than its routing did - You suspect a campaign cluster (multiple indicators in incident telemetry) and want to confirm common infrastructure
- A threat-actor profile mentions an indicator and you want to see the wider footprint
- You need to clearly document a pivot chain so a reviewer can trace your reasoning end-to-end
Pivot decision trees, with the commands to run
For each starting indicator type: a tree of pivots, then the concrete commands. The /lookup-* form is the skill-invocation; the python3 tools/clis/... form is the underlying CLI. Both are equivalent — pick whichever the surrounding context demands.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 427 lines · 103 tokens per session scan A 2ba56aff2152
indicator-pivoting is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 103 tokens to every session and 6,359 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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