Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill likelihood-languagegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/likelihood-language)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/likelihood-language"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/likelihood-language/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/likelihood-language"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/likelihood-language.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00052 | $0.00951 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00380 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00190 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00095 |
Grade A, and why
likelihood-language scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 75 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Likelihood Language — Probability Yardstick
Every forward-looking assessment (prediction, forecast, risk statement) MUST use standardised likelihood language. Never use vague terms like "could", "might", or "may" without mapping them to a probability band.
The Yardstick
| Term | Probability Range | Usage |
|---|---|---|
| Almost certain | >95% | Use sparingly. Reserved for near-inevitable outcomes with overwhelming evidence. |
| Highly likely | 75-95% | Strong evidence supporting the assessment. Limited plausible alternatives. |
| Likely | 50-75% | The weight of evidence supports this outcome, but meaningful alternatives exist. |
| Realistic possibility | 25-50% | Plausible outcome that cannot be discounted. Evidence is mixed or limited. |
| Unlikely | 15-25% | Possible but not supported by the weight of evidence. |
| Highly unlikely | 5-15% | Very limited evidence suggests this outcome. Most evidence points elsewhere. |
| Remote | <5% | Theoretically possible but requires multiple unlikely conditions to align. |
How to Use
Correct usage
"It is highly likely (75-95%) that the threat actor will shift targeting to the financial sector in Q3, based on observed reconnaissance activity and historical pattern of seasonal targeting shifts."
"There is a realistic possibility (25-50%) that the exploit will be weaponised within 30 days, given the availability of a proof-of-concept but no evidence of active exploitation."
Incorrect usage
"The threat actor might target financial services." ❌ (No probability band) "It could happen in Q3." ❌ (Vague, unquantified) "We think it's likely but also possible that..." ❌ (Contradictory — pick one band)
Combining with Confidence
Likelihood and confidence are independent dimensions:
"We assess with moderate confidence that it is likely (50-75%) that Group X will conduct destructive operations against energy sector targets in the next 6 months."
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 75 lines · 52 tokens per session scan A 43b43fba0db5
likelihood-language is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 52 tokens to every session and 951 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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