Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-crowdstrikeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-crowdstrike)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-crowdstrike"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-crowdstrike/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-crowdstrike"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-crowdstrike.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00126 | $0.02472 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00050 | $0.00989 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00025 | $0.00494 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00247 |
Grade A, and why
lookup-crowdstrike scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 148 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
lookup-crowdstrike
Queries the CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence (Intel) API for indicator (IOC) reputation, threat-actor (adversary) profiles, actor search by origin/target, MITRE ATT&CK technique coverage, and finished intelligence reports. Retrieval only — do not interpret, assess, or conclude. The invoking skill or agent reasons about the result.
When to invoke
- User asks to look up an IP / domain / hash / URL and CrowdStrike credentials are configured — return CrowdStrike's malicious-confidence, linked actors, malware families, and report references alongside the other lookups
- User asks for the latest / recent malicious IOCs, a CrowdStrike indicator feed, or "what's CrowdStrike seeing lately" →
indicators --malicious(browse/sweep, newest-first; filter by type/actor/malware/recency) - User asks "what TTPs / techniques does use?" →
ttps <actor>(MITRE ATT&CK mapping) - User asks "which threat actors operate from ?" / "who targets ?" →
actors --origin <c>/--target-industry <i> - User asks to profile a named adversary (Charming Kitten, Mustang Panda, Cozy Bear, …) →
actor <name> - User wants the latest finished reporting on an actor or topic →
reports --actor <name> --latestorreports --search "<topic>" /threat-actor-profilingor a regional espionage cell wants vendor-authoritative attribution, origins, motivations, and capability- Need to download a specific intel report PDF by ID →
reports --pdf <id>
How to invoke
One CLI: a Python wrapper around the official crowdstrike-falconpy SDK. Self-bootstraps a private venv at tools/clis/.venv-crowdstrike/ on first run; no global install. The SDK exchanges your client id + secret for an OAuth2 bearer token at /oauth2/token automatically.
# IOC reputation — ip / domain / hash / url (auto-detected by CrowdStrike via FQL indicator: match)
python3 tools/clis/crowdstrike.py indicator <value> [--limit N] [--include-deleted]
# Browse / sweep the indicator feed — latest malicious IOCs, by type / actor / recency
python3 tools/clis/crowdstrike.py indicators [--malicious] [--type ip|domain|url|hash|md5|sha1|sha256|email] \
[--actor "<name>"] [--malware <family>] [--since 7d] [--filter "<FQL>"] [--limit N]
# Profile a single named threat actor (adversary)
python3 tools/clis/crowdstrike.py actor "<name>" [--limit N] [--fields F1,F2,...]
# Search actors by origin / target / motivation / raw FQL
python3 tools/clis/crowdstrike.py actors [--origin russia] [--target-country united-states] \
[--target-industry financial-services] [--motivation state-sponsored] [--filter "<FQL>"] [--limit N]
# Finished intel reports — by actor, free-text, latest-first, or PDF download
python3 tools/clis/crowdstrike.py reports [--actor "<name>"] [--search "<q>"] [--filter "<FQL>"] \
[--latest] [--limit N] [--pdf <report_id> --out <path>]
# MITRE ATT&CK techniques mapped to an actor (add --detailed for the full Navigator/CSV/JSON report)
python3 tools/clis/crowdstrike.py ttps "<actor>" [--detailed] [--format csv|json|json_navigator]
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed · -47 tokens per session c78789f5b20b
- 2mo ago First seen · 148 lines · 173 tokens per session scan A a58d36a5535e
lookup-crowdstrike is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 126 tokens to every session and 2,472 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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