Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-openctiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-opencti)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-opencti"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-opencti/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-opencti"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/lookup-opencti.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00096 | $0.02842 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.01137 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00568 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00284 |
Grade A, and why
lookup-opencti scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 188 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
lookup-opencti
Two-way bridge to an OpenCTI threat-intelligence platform. OpenCTI is a STIX 2.1-native knowledge base: everything in it — indicators, observables, intrusion sets, malware, reports, campaigns — is a STIX entity connected by relationships. Like /lookup-misp, this skill also writes: it can create indicators and observables, label and TLP-mark entities, relate them, and import STIX 2.1 bundles. Treat write commands as deliberate actions; don't use them in autonomous enrichment loops. The delete command is destructive — always confirm with the user before invoking it.
When to invoke
Read:
- An indicator was found by another lookup (VT, OTX, …) — check whether your OpenCTI instance already knows it (
lookup) - An analyst wants the entities, reports, or campaigns your platform holds on an actor, malware family, or CVE (
search,list,get) - You need recent high-score indicators, this quarter's incidents, or everything carrying a given label (
listwith filters) - You want to verify connector health or instance version (
connectors,version)
Write:
- A finished investigation produced indicators that belong in your knowledge base
- A STIX 2.1 bundle written via
/stix-bundleshould be imported as entities - An existing entity needs labels, a TLP marking, a score update, or a relationship to another entity
Do NOT invoke for:
- Bulk reputation enrichment (use VT/OTX/RL first; only push the vetted subset into OpenCTI)
- Scanning or pivoting on raw internet infrastructure — OpenCTI is a curated dataset, not a scanning service. Use Shodan/Censys for that.
- Community sharing — that's MISP's job (
/lookup-misp). OpenCTI is your internal knowledge graph; MISP is the exchange layer. Many teams run both, synced by a connector.
How to invoke
Single Python CLI (stdlib only — no install). Single endpoint: everything is GraphQL against $OPENCTI_URL/graphql with Authorization: Bearer $OPENCTI_TOKEN.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed · -27 tokens per session ed12020c6f1c
- 1mo ago Changed · +4 lines 5674d26d3a01
- 2mo ago First seen · 184 lines · 123 tokens per session scan A 70b2c9920f45
lookup-opencti is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 96 tokens to every session and 2,842 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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