Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill osint-methodologygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/osint-methodology)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/osint-methodology"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/osint-methodology/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/osint-methodology"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/osint-methodology.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00032 | $0.01213 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00485 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00243 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00121 |
Grade A, and why
osint-methodology scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
OSINT Collection Methodology
Collection Planning
Before collecting, define:
- Objective: What specific intelligence do we need?
- Scope: What sources are relevant? What's out of scope?
- Keywords: Search terms, aliases, IOCs to look for
- Time constraints: How recent must the intelligence be?
- Documentation: How will findings be recorded?
Source Categories
| Category | Sources | Best For |
|---|---|---|
| Government advisories | CISA, NCSC, CERT-EU, national CERTs | Authoritative threat alerts, vulnerability warnings |
| Vendor reports | Mandiant, CrowdStrike, Microsoft, Recorded Future, Talos | Campaign analysis, actor profiles, malware analysis |
| Security research | Blogs, conference talks, academic papers | Novel techniques, deep dives, vulnerability research |
| Underground | Forum mirrors, paste sites, Telegram (public), leak aggregators | Threat actor communications, credential dumps, tools |
| Code repositories | GitHub, GitLab | Malware source, PoC exploits, attacker tools, leaked configs |
| Certificate transparency | crt.sh, Censys | Domain enumeration, infrastructure mapping |
| DNS/WHOIS | SecurityTrails, DomainTools, RiskIQ (via web search) | Infrastructure relationships, historical records |
| News/media | Tech press, infosec news sites | Incident reports, geopolitical context |
| Social media | X/Twitter, LinkedIn, Reddit (public) | OPSEC failures, community intelligence, actor claims |
Search Operator Cheat Sheet
Google Dorks
site:example.com filetype:pdf # PDFs on a specific site
"threat actor" AND "APT28" -site:reddit.com # Exclude noise
inurl:"/wp-content/uploads/" filetype:exe # Exposed uploads
"index of" "/backup" # Directory listings
intitle:"login" site:*.example.com # Login pages on subdomains
GitHub Search
org:target-org password # Leaked credentials
filename:.env DB_PASSWORD # Exposed environment files
"api_key" language:python # Hardcoded API keys
"BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" # Exposed private keys
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 117 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A cfedfaaf1850
osint-methodology is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 1,213 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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