Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill ransomware-ecosystemgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/ransomware-ecosystem)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/ransomware-ecosystem"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/ransomware-ecosystem/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/ransomware-ecosystem"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/ransomware-ecosystem.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00076 | $0.07090 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00030 | $0.02836 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.01418 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00709 |
Grade A, and why
ransomware-ecosystem scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 195 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Ransomware Ecosystem
Executive Summary
The ransomware ecosystem operates predominantly through a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model, where operator groups develop and maintain ransomware payloads, negotiate with victims, and manage leak sites, while affiliates — independent contractors — handle the actual intrusion, lateral movement, and deployment. This division of labor has driven the industrialization of ransomware since roughly 2019, enabling groups to scale operations far beyond what a single team could achieve. Revenue sharing typically follows a 70/30 or 80/20 split favoring the affiliate, though elite affiliates can negotiate better terms. The double-extortion model (encrypting data AND threatening to leak it) is now standard, with some groups pursuing triple extortion by adding DDoS threats or contacting victims' customers directly.
Law enforcement pressure has been continuous since 2023: Hive (January 2023), LockBit in Operation Cronos (February 2024), Phobos/8Base (February 2025), BlackSuit in Operation Checkmate (July 2025), and in 2026 a shift toward shared criminal infrastructure, with the First VPN anonymization service (May 2026) and the AudiA6 laundering service (June 2026) taken down [14][16][25][26]. Groups have also collapsed from the inside. ALPHV/BlackCat exit-scammed in March 2024, Black Basta dissolved after its internal chats leaked in February 2025, and RansomHub, the leading brand of 2024, went offline on 1 April 2025 and has not returned [11][12][18]. None of this reduced volume. Displaced affiliates moved to other programs and new brands filled the gaps.
Payments and attack volume have decoupled. Chainalysis tracked about $820 million in on-chain ransomware payments in 2025, down 8% from a revised $892 million in 2024, while claimed incidents rose about 50% to an all-time high [9]. Fewer victims pay: Chainalysis puts the 2025 payment rate at roughly 28%, Coveware reported a record-low rate in Q2 2026, with only 15% of data-exfiltration-only victims paying, and Check Point cites approximately 23% [9][10][22]. Those who do pay are paying more, with the median on-chain payment rising from $12,738 to $59,556 in 2025 [9].
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +71 lines a87e4f241aaf
- 2mo ago First seen · 124 lines · 76 tokens per session scan A fc15163c5195
ransomware-ecosystem is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 76 tokens to every session and 7,090 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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