Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill russia-cyber-espionagegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/russia-cyber-espionage)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/russia-cyber-espionage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/russia-cyber-espionage/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/russia-cyber-espionage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/russia-cyber-espionage.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00080 | $0.08726 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00032 | $0.03490 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.01745 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00873 |
Grade A, and why
russia-cyber-espionage scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 259 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Russia Cyber Espionage Knowledge Cell
Executive Summary
Russia maintains one of the most capable and aggressive state-sponsored cyber operations programs globally, distributed across three primary intelligence services: the GRU (military intelligence), SVR (foreign intelligence), and FSB (federal security service). GRU units run the most disruptive and destructive operations and the largest credential-theft campaigns. The SVR conducts long-term espionage against governments, diplomats and cloud identity systems. The FSB runs both high-volume operations against Ukraine (Gamaredon) and selective, long-lived espionage (Turla, Center 16 network-device intrusions, Star Blizzard).
The war in Ukraine remains the center of gravity. ESET reporting covering October 2024 to March 2026 describes Sandworm deploying a succession of new wipers (ZEROLOT, Sting and others) against Ukrainian energy, government, logistics and grain-sector targets, and Gamaredon as the most active group targeting Ukraine [10][11][12]. APT28 has spent more than two years targeting Western logistics and technology companies that move aid to Ukraine [9], and Ukrainian drone manufacturers are now a recurring target for both GRU and SVR-linked operators [12][25].
Three developments since early 2025 change the picture. First, destructive activity reached a NATO member: on 29 December 2025 wipers and attacks on industrial devices hit more than 30 wind and solar farms, a combined heat and power plant and a manufacturer in Poland [14]. Attribution is contested. ESET attributes the DynoWiper malware to Sandworm with medium confidence [13], CERT Polska reports infrastructure overlap with the FSB-linked cluster known as Static Tundra or Berserk Bear [14], and in July 2026 the UK and EU member states formally attributed the attack to FSB Center 16 [15][16]. Second, Russian services are increasingly working from the network path rather than the endpoint: Turla uses an ISP-level adversary-in-the-middle position inside Russia against embassies [26], APT28 hijacked DNS on compromised home and small-office routers [35], and a Midnight Blizzard sub-cluster manipulated hotel and conference Wi-Fi captive portals [24]. Third, Western governments have moved against the ecosystem around the services: Operation Eastwood against NoName057(16) in July 2025 [39], US indictments and a joint advisory on GRU-supported hacktivist fronts in December 2025 [37][38], a US disruption of the APT28 router network in April 2026 [35], and coordinated UK and EU sanctions in July 2026 [15][17].
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +119 lines 0686f09f74c7
- 2mo ago First seen · 140 lines · 80 tokens per session scan A aaba8e4ff37c
russia-cyber-espionage is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 80 tokens to every session and 8,726 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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