Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill stix-bundlegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/stix-bundle)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/stix-bundle"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/stix-bundle/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/stix-bundle"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/stix-bundle.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00063 | $0.04278 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00025 | $0.01711 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00856 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00428 |
Grade A, and why
stix-bundle scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 369 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
STIX 2.1 Bundle Creation
STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 is the standard for representing and sharing cyber threat intelligence.
Bundle Structure
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--<UUID>",
"objects": [
// Array of STIX Domain Objects (SDOs) and Relationship Objects (SROs)
]
}
STIX Domain Objects (SDOs)
Indicator
Represents a pattern that can be used to detect suspicious activity.
{
"type": "indicator",
"spec_version": "2.1",
"id": "indicator--<UUID>",
"created": "2026-01-15T00:00:00.000Z",
"modified": "2026-01-15T00:00:00.000Z",
"name": "Malicious IP used by APT28",
"description": "C2 server observed in campaign targeting European government entities",
"pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '203.0.113.42']",
"pattern_type": "stix",
"valid_from": "2026-01-15T00:00:00.000Z",
"valid_until": "2026-04-15T00:00:00.000Z",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
],
"confidence": 70,
"labels": ["malicious-activity"],
"object_marking_refs": ["marking-definition--613f2e26-407d-48c7-9eca-b8e91df99dc9"]
}
STIX Pattern Syntax
| IOC Type | STIX Pattern |
|---|---|
| IPv4 | [ipv4-addr:value = '1.2.3.4'] |
| IPv6 | [ipv6-addr:value = '2001:db8::1'] |
| Domain | [domain-name:value = 'evil.com'] |
| URL | [url:value = 'https://evil.com/payload'] |
| SHA-256 | [file:hashes.'SHA-256' = 'abc123...'] |
| MD5 | [file:hashes.MD5 = 'abc123...'] |
[email-addr:value = '[email protected]'] |
|
| File name | [file:name = 'malware.exe'] |
| Combined | [file:hashes.'SHA-256' = 'abc...' AND file:name = 'payload.dll'] |
Threat Actor
{
"type": "threat-actor",
"spec_version": "2.1",
"id": "threat-actor--<UUID>",
"created": "2026-01-15T00:00:00.000Z",
"modified": "2026-01-15T00:00:00.000Z",
"name": "APT28",
"description": "Russian state-sponsored threat actor also known as Fancy Bear, Sofacy",
"aliases": ["Fancy Bear", "Sofacy", "Pawn Storm", "Forest Blizzard"],
"threat_actor_types": ["nation-state"],
"roles": ["agent"],
"sophistication": "expert",
"resource_level": "government",
"primary_motivation": "political",
"goals": ["espionage", "disruption"]
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +119 lines · +34 tokens per session c428b0906ef9
- 2mo ago First seen · 250 lines · 29 tokens per session scan A bc8d1efcfc57
stix-bundle is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 4,278 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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sensitive-information-disclosure
Hunt LLM sensitive-information disclosure (OWASP LLM02:2025) — leakage of PII, secrets, internal source, model details, and other-tenant data through model outputs, training-data extraction, or retrieval-side joins.
vector-and-embedding-weaknesses
Hunt vector / embedding weaknesses (OWASP LLM08:2025) — adversarial inputs against the RAG / similarity layer that cause cross-tenant leak, embedding-inversion privacy loss, semantic confusion, and retriever-driven prompt injection.
aatmf-t12-rag-poisoning
AATMF T12 — RAG & Knowledge Base Manipulation. PoisonedRAG, vector store flood, embedding collision, retrieval-bias attacks.