Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill supply-chain-threatsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00064 | $0.08926 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00026 | $0.03570 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.01785 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00893 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain-threats scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 229 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply Chain Threats
Executive Summary
Software supply chain attacks target the trust relationships between organizations and their software vendors, open-source dependencies, SaaS integrations, and managed service providers. Rather than attacking a target directly, adversaries compromise an upstream component — a package maintainer account, a CI/CD workflow, an update channel, an OAuth integration, or an MSP's remote management tooling — to reach many downstream victims at once. The defining incidents of 2020 to 2024 (SolarWinds, Kaseya, 3CX, MOVEit, XZ Utils) remain the reference cases, but the threat picture as of September 2026 is dominated by a different pattern: high-tempo, credential-stealing attacks on the developer ecosystem itself.
Three shifts stand out since early 2025. First, self-propagating package worms became routine. Shai-Hulud (September 2025) was described by Wiz as the first successful self-propagating attack in the npm ecosystem; it was followed by Shai-Hulud 2.0 (November 2025), the "Mini Shai-Hulud" waves attributed to TeamPCP (April to June 2026), and ChainDrop (August 2026), which infected hundreds of packages within hours. The Mini Shai-Hulud source code was published in May 2026, and Red Hat now describes the derived "Miasma" payload as an open-source malware kit, so later waves cannot be assumed to be the work of one group. Second, CI/CD became the primary entry point: the tj-actions/changed-files compromise (March 2025), the Nx "s1ngularity" incident (August 2025), the Trivy compromise (March 2026) and the TanStack compromise (May 2026) all abused GitHub Actions, and the TanStack wave produced malicious packages carrying valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance. Third, North Korean actors moved to social engineering of maintainers of very widely used packages: Google, Microsoft and Amazon attribute the axios compromise (March 2026) to a DPRK actor tracked as UNC1069 or Sapphire Sleet.
Outside the package registries, SaaS-to-SaaS OAuth token theft emerged as a supply-chain class of its own (Salesloft Drift in August 2025, Gainsight in November 2025, Klue in June 2026), Cl0p continued its mass-exploitation model against enterprise applications (Oracle E-Business Suite in 2025, PTC Windchill in 2026), and update channels were hijacked at the infrastructure layer (Notepad++ in 2025, Virtualizor and Coder's module registry in August 2026). Registry operators have responded with time-based defenses: Dependabot now waits three days before proposing non-security version updates, and PyPI rejects new files on releases older than 14 days.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +102 lines 064133a3d808
- 2mo ago First seen · 127 lines · 64 tokens per session scan A 838f3bd087e5
supply-chain-threats is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 64 tokens to every session and 8,926 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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