Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill supply-chain-threatsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/supply-chain-threats.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00064 | $0.02946 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.01473 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00589 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00295 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain-threats scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 127 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply Chain Threats
Executive Summary
Software supply chain attacks target the trust relationships between organizations and their software vendors, open-source dependencies, and managed service providers. Rather than attacking a target directly, adversaries compromise an upstream component — a software update mechanism, a widely used library, a build pipeline, or an MSP's remote management tools — to gain access to potentially thousands of downstream victims simultaneously. The asymmetric return on investment makes supply chain attacks attractive to both state-sponsored groups seeking broad intelligence collection and cybercriminals pursuing mass exploitation.
The period from 2020 to 2024 saw several defining supply chain incidents that reshaped the threat landscape. The SolarWinds attack (discovered December 2020, attributed to Russia's SVR/APT29) demonstrated how a nation-state could compromise a single software build process to implant backdoors in updates distributed to 18,000 organizations, ultimately targeting select government agencies and technology companies. The 3CX compromise (March 2023, attributed to North Korea's Lazarus Group) showed supply chain attacks chaining through other supply chain attacks — the initial compromise traced back to a trojanized X_TRADER application from Trading Technologies. The Cl0p ransomware group's mass exploitation of MOVEit Transfer (May-June 2023) affected over 2,500 organizations through a single zero-day in a widely deployed file transfer product.
Open-source software supply chain attacks have escalated in parallel, targeting package registries like npm, PyPI, and RubyGems through techniques including typosquatting (publishing packages with names similar to popular ones), dependency confusion (exploiting private vs. public package resolution), and outright account compromise of legitimate package maintainers. The XZ Utils backdoor (discovered March 2024) represented perhaps the most sophisticated open-source supply chain attack ever attempted: a patient, multi-year social engineering campaign to gain maintainer trust and insert a backdoor into a foundational compression library used by SSH across most Linux distributions, narrowly discovered before widespread deployment. Industry responses include the SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) framework and increased adoption of software bills of materials (SBOMs).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 127 lines · 64 tokens per session scan A 838f3bd087e5
supply-chain-threats is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (18 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 64 tokens to every session and 2,946 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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