Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Liberty91LTD/cti-skills --skill threat-actor-profilinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Liberty91LTD/cti-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/threat-actor-profiling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/threat-actor-profiling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/threat-actor-profiling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/threat-actor-profiling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/liberty91ltd/cti-skills/threat-actor-profiling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00060 | $0.02660 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.01064 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00532 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00266 |
Grade A, and why
threat-actor-profiling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 151 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Actor Profiling
A threat actor profile is a living document that consolidates everything known about a threat group. It grows over time as new intelligence is collected.
Sourcing Before Profiling
A profile is built from claims, and each claim belongs to the source that originated it. Before any report feeds the profile:
- Resolve provenance. Run
/source-provenanceon every ingested report or article. Record the primary, the chain and theprovenance_basis(platform-resolved, script-resolved or model-judged). - Dedupe by primary, not by URL. Five outlets covering one vendor report are one source. Merge them into a single Sources row for the primary and list the outlets as "via". Count corroboration by independent primaries with separate access only.
- Grade per claim. Run
/quality-of-information-checkon the primary (it calls/claim-extraction). Observations, attribution and assessments from the same report carry different grades. Do not give a report one grade and apply it to everything in it. - Store the grade with the entity. Every TTP row, tooling row, attribution statement and campaign entry carries the primary that supports it and the grade of the supporting claim. When two primaries support the same row, list both and keep the grades separate.
An entity with no resolved primary stays in the profile only with the grade "untraced, tentative" or lower and the note "unresolved provenance". Grades follow the fixed rubric in /quality-of-information-check (references/grading-rubric.md). The grade is two words, access level then claim support, for example "direct, firm". It is not an Admiralty rating.
Profile Template
## Threat Actor Profile: [Primary Name]
### Summary
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Primary Name** | [Most commonly used name] |
| **Aliases** | [All known aliases across vendors] |
| **Attribution** | [State sponsor / Criminal group / Hacktivist — with confidence level] |
| **Affiliation** | [Specific agency/unit if known, e.g., GRU Unit 26165] |
| **Motivation** | [Espionage / Financial / Disruption / Hacktivism / Mixed] |
| **Active Since** | [Year of first known activity] |
| **Status** | [Active / Dormant / Disbanded] |
| **Sophistication** | [Low / Medium / High / Advanced] |
| **Primary Targets** | [Sectors and geographies] |
| **Assessment Date** | [Date of this profile version] |
| **Provenance basis** | [platform-resolved / script-resolved / model-judged (worst of the sources used)] |
| **Alias source** | [user / liberty91 / none] |
### Attribution Assessment
[Detailed attribution discussion with confidence level. Who attributes this group and based on what evidence? Where do vendors disagree?]
| Attribution statement | Primary | Stated confidence (verbatim) | Access level | Claim support | Independent primaries |
|-----------------------|---------|------------------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| [Actor is linked to X] | [Org, report title, date] | ["moderate confidence" / not stated] | [e.g., limited] | [e.g., tentative] | [Count, and basis] |
### Targeting
**Sectors**: [List targeted sectors with evidence]
**Geographies**: [Targeted countries/regions]
**Selection criteria**: [How does this group choose targets? Opportunistic vs targeted?]
**Evolution**: [How has targeting changed over time?]
### TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK)
| Tactic | Technique | ID | Notes | Primary | Access level | Claim support |
|--------|-----------|-----|-------|---------|--------------|---------------|
| Initial Access | Spearphishing Attachment | T1566.001 | Primary delivery method | [Org, date] | [e.g., direct] | [e.g., firm] |
| Execution | PowerShell | T1059.001 | Used for download and execute | [Org, date] | [e.g., limited] | [e.g., firm] |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
### Tooling
| Tool | Type | Custom/Commodity | First Seen | Status | Notes | Primary | Access level | Claim support |
|------|------|-----------------|-----------|--------|-------|---------|--------------|---------------|
| [Tool 1] | Backdoor | Custom | 2024 | Active | Primary implant | [Org, date] | [e.g., limited] | [e.g., firm] |
| Cobalt Strike | C2 | Commodity | 2023 | Active | Used with modified profiles | [Org, date] | [e.g., direct] | [e.g., firm] |
### Infrastructure Patterns
- **Hosting preferences**: [Cloud providers, bulletproof hosting, compromised infrastructure]
- **Registrars**: [Preferred domain registrars]
- **TLS patterns**: [Self-signed? Let's Encrypt? Specific CAs?]
- **C2 protocols**: [HTTP/HTTPS, DNS, custom protocols]
- **IP ranges**: [Known IP blocks or ASNs]
### Campaign History
#### [Campaign 1] (YYYY-MM to YYYY-MM)
- **Targets**: [Who was targeted]
- **TTPs**: [Specific techniques used]
- **Outcome**: [Impact, attribution confidence]
- **References**: [Primary reports, each with the grade of the claim it supports]
### Relationships
- **Related groups**: [Parent/child groups, shared infrastructure, shared tools]
- **Overlap with**: [Groups that share TTPs or infrastructure]
- **Distinction from**: [Commonly confused groups and how to distinguish]
### Intelligence Gaps
- [What we don't know and need to collect]
- [Specific questions for future collection]
### Sources
One row per primary. Outlets that carried the primary go in "Via".
| Date | Primary source | Via | Access | Access level | Key Contribution |
|------|----------------|-----|--------|--------------|-----------------|
| YYYY-MM-DD | [Originating org and report title] | [Outlets, or "direct"] | [telemetry / ir_engagement / sample_analysis / osint / undisclosed] | [direct / limited / indirect / untraced / adversary] | [What this source contributed to the profile] |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +34 lines 8bc7336f94c8
- 2mo ago First seen · 117 lines · 60 tokens per session scan A edcef7c4f9d3
threat-actor-profiling is a skill published in the GitHub repository Liberty91LTD/cti-skills (36 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 60 tokens to every session and 2,660 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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