Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/lingoverse/mimir/security-checknpx skills add LingoVerse/mimir --skill security-checkgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/LingoVerse/mimirWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00048 | $0.00686 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00343 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00137 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00069 |
Grade A, and why
security-check scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 55 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Check
This pass runs only when the diff touches a security-sensitive surface. Assume an adversary controls every input. Your job is to find the specific line where a trust boundary is crossed without a check — not to give a generic security lecture.
Trust-boundary checklist
Walk the changed code and ask, for each external input:
- Injection — Is user-controlled data concatenated into SQL, shell commands, HTML, templates, regex, or file paths without parameterization/escaping? Flag the exact line.
- AuthN / AuthZ — Does a new endpoint, route, or handler verify identity AND permissions? Look for missing ownership checks (IDOR: can user A act on user B's resource by changing an ID?).
- Secrets — Any API key, token, password, private key, or connection string hardcoded or logged? Any secret added to a non-secret config file?
- Input validation — Are size, type, range, and format validated before use? Unbounded input → DoS. Unvalidated redirects/URLs → SSRF / open redirect.
- Deserialization & parsing — Untrusted data into
eval,Function, YAML/pickle loaders, or XML parsers with external entities? - Path traversal — User input in file paths without normalization + allowlist?
- Crypto — Home-rolled crypto, weak/legacy algorithms, missing randomness, predictable tokens, comparison of secrets with non-constant-time equality?
- Dependencies — New dependency added: is it reputable and pinned? Manifest change that widens version ranges or pulls an unmaintained package?
- CI / IaC / Docker — New workflow running untrusted PR code with secrets in scope?
pull_request_targetmisuse? Overly broad cloud IAM? Container running as root, secrets baked into image layers? - Migrations — Destructive or non-reversible schema change? Data exposure via a new column/table without access control?
Reporting
Use the same JSON output format as review-rubric. For each security finding:
- Severity is almost always
criticalormajor. Reservecriticalfor exploitable issues (clear path from attacker input to impact) and confirmed secret exposure. - In
body, state the attack: "An attacker who controls X can do Y because Z is not checked." Concrete, not theoretical. - In
suggestion, give the specific mitigation (parameterized query, authz check location, validation, constant-time compare), not "sanitize the input".
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 55 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A f9bd668d16ab
security-check is a skill published in the GitHub repository LingoVerse/mimir (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 686 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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