Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to linuxfoundation/lfx-self-serve. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/linuxfoundation/lfx-self-serve/main/.github/skills/self-serve-security-review/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/linuxfoundation/lfx-self-serveWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/linuxfoundation/lfx-self-serve/self-serve-security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/linuxfoundation/lfx-self-serve/self-serve-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/linuxfoundation/lfx-self-serve/self-serve-security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/linuxfoundation/lfx-self-serve/self-serve-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/linuxfoundation/lfx-self-serve/self-serve-security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00155 | $0.03440 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00062 | $0.01376 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00031 | $0.00688 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00344 |
Grade A, and why
self-serve-security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 27d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 240 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Self Serve Security Review
LFX One is the authenticated front door for every persona. It holds the
user's OIDC session and brokers each authenticated business request to the
microservice mesh with that user's identity and bearer token. It also
exposes a deliberately public surface — the data-bearing /meetings/ join
pages and /public/api, plus /docs, health, and a few non-data utility
routes — reachable without a user session, where handlers use M2M credentials
for the upstream calls that need them (optional-auth routes may still carry a
user token). auth.middleware.ts is the authoritative inventory for routes that
reach the auth middleware (the OIDC login/logout/callback routes mount earlier
in server.ts), so verify a route's class there before calling a public route
a regression. So the
failure modes that matter here are a cross-user or cross-persona authorization
bypass, a session or token leak, member PII exposure, and anything that
lets an anonymous caller reach more than the public surface intends. Those
facts set the stakes for every security judgment.
Methodology
Run a focused, diff-aware review, not a whole-repo audit:
- Only new risk. Assess what this PR introduces or weakens. Do not relitigate pre-existing issues the diff does not touch.
- Assume hostile input, report only what is real. Flag only high-confidence,
concretely exploitable findings: if you cannot trace a path from an
attacker-controlled input (a request param, body, header, cookie, the
returnToURL, user- or project-supplied content) to a sensitive sink, it is not a reportable security finding. - Three passes.
- Context: discover, from the code and the repo docs at review time, the
guards this application relies on around the diff (the route's auth class,
the effective-identity helpers,
validateAndSanitizeUrl/fetchSafeUrl, the logger's redaction, Angular's default sanitizer,constantTimeEquals). Never assume a guard exists; find it. - Comparative: does the change deviate from the guard patterns the
surrounding code establishes?
docs/reviews/knowledge-base/security.mdrecords the patterns this repo has been bitten by — use it as a checklist of known shapes, not a substitute for tracing the actual path. - Assessment: trace each input to its sink and confirm a guard sits on the path the data actually takes, not three functions away.
- Context: discover, from the code and the repo docs at review time, the
guards this application relies on around the diff (the route's auth class,
the effective-identity helpers,
- Confidence-gate every finding (1-10, report only >= 8, matching the reviewer skill's >=80% gate). A few real findings beat a speculative list.
- Evidence, not vibes. Each finding names the file and function, what the attacker controls, the boundary crossed, the concrete impact, and the fix.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 27d ago Changed d64fc11e7b99
- 2mo ago First seen · 240 lines · 155 tokens per session scan A 2cb0c05ab87b
self-serve-security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository linuxfoundation/lfx-self-serve (16 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 155 tokens to every session and 3,440 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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