mobile-app-security

mobile-app-security is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from makifbaysal/tasktrooper. It costs 58 tokens per session (1,906 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

A security review guide for iOS, Android, and Flutter applications. It explains risks involving data stored on the device, network connections, app components, deep links, WebViews, bundled secrets, and Firebase rules.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to review token storage, cleartext traffic, TLS trust, exported components, deep links, WebView bridges, certificate-pinning claims, embedded secrets, and backend access rules.
Why use it?
A mobile app can be read or modified by the person using the device, and client-side checks can be bypassed. The guide helps reviewers separate real protection failures from issues that do not protect anyone else.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit Use it to review token storage, cleartext traffic, TLS trust, exported components, deep links, WebView bridges, certificate-pinning claims, embedded secrets, and backend access rules.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/mobile-app-security
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add makifbaysal/tasktrooper --skill mobile-app-security
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/makifbaysal/tasktrooper

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for mobile-app-security

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/mobile-app-security/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/mobile-app-security)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/mobile-app-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/mobile-app-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for mobile-app-security

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/mobile-app-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/mobile-app-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 58 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,906 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00058 $0.01906
Opus 5.5 $0.00023 $0.00762
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00012 $0.00381
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00191

Measured 4d ago against content hash a93c6553f510, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

mobile-app-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

catalog/agents/security-agent/skills/mobile-app-security/SKILL.md · 122 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 122 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Mobile App Security (MASVS)

Overview

The app binary is public and the device may belong to the attacker. Two consequences shape every mobile finding: anything shipped in the app is readable (a "hidden" server secret is leaked), and any check done only in the app can be skipped (the server is the boundary). What remains for the app is protecting its user from other apps, other networks and other web content.

Core principle: ask who the attacker is — another app on the device, someone on the network, a web page in a WebView, or the device owner. Findings against the device owner protecting their own data are usually not findings.

1. Secrets Shipped in the App (MASVS-CRYPTO, MASVS-CODE)

A server secret in BuildConfig, Info.plist, a bundled .env, strings.xml, Dart constants or an obfuscated string is a leaked secret — CRITICAL when live (secrets-and-crypto-review).

Not findings: Firebase google-services.json / GoogleService-Info.plist, Maps keys restricted by app signature, publishable payment keys. But the Firebase rules that protect the data are in scope:

// ❌ firestore.rules — every client reads and writes everything
match /{document=**} { allow read, write: if true; }
// ✅
match /users/{uid} { allow read, write: if request.auth != null && request.auth.uid == uid; }

2. Storage (MASVS-STORAGE)

❌ for tokens and credentials ✅
Android SharedPreferences, plain files, SQLite, external storage Keystore-backed encryption (Tink/AndroidX security), DataStore with an encrypted serializer
iOS UserDefaults, plist files, unencrypted Core Data Keychain with an appropriate kSecAttrAccessible…ThisDeviceOnly class
Flutter shared_preferences, Hive unencrypted flutter_secure_storage

Severity follows the attacker: world-readable files (MODE_WORLD_READABLE, external storage) or data included in backups (android:allowBackup="true" without exclusions) → HIGH for credentials; private app storage on a non-rooted device → MEDIUM note. Tokens in Log.d/print/NSLog → readable by logcat tools and crash reporters → MEDIUM to HIGH.

Read the full file on GitHub · 122 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 4d ago First seen · 122 lines · 58 tokens per session scan A a93c6553f510

Subscribe to this mod's changes

mobile-app-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository makifbaysal/tasktrooper (113 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 58 tokens to every session and 1,906 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-09.