Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add makifbaysal/tasktrooper --skill web-frontend-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/makifbaysal/tasktrooperWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/web-frontend-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/web-frontend-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/web-frontend-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/web-frontend-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/makifbaysal/tasktrooper/web-frontend-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.01755 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00702 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00351 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00176 |
Grade A, and why
web-frontend-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Web Frontend Security
Overview
Modern template engines and UI frameworks escape by default. XSS comes back through the doors that switch escaping off, through the wrong escaper for the context, and through URLs. CSRF comes back whenever cookies authenticate a state change.
Core principle: find the escape hatch, then trace what flows into it. {value} in JSX is the control working — not a finding.
1. XSS Sinks by Framework (CWE-79)
| Framework / engine | Escape hatches to trace |
|---|---|
| React / Preact / Solid | dangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML props, refs writing el.innerHTML |
| Vue | v-html, render functions setting innerHTML |
| Angular | bypassSecurityTrustHtml/Url/ResourceUrl/Script/Style ([innerHTML] alone is sanitised) |
| Svelte | {@html …} |
| DOM / jQuery | innerHTML, outerHTML, insertAdjacentHTML, document.write, .html(), $(userString), iframe.srcdoc |
| Jinja2 / Django | ` |
| Go | template.HTML(userValue), text/template used to render HTML |
| JVM | Thymeleaf th:utext, JSP <%= %> or escapeXml="false", FreeMarker ?no_esc |
| Node templates | Handlebars {{{ }}}, EJS <%- %>, Pug != |
| .NET | @Html.Raw, MarkupString |
// ❌ user-authored bio rendered as HTML
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: user.bio }} />
// ✅ sanitised with an allowlist sanitiser, or rendered as text
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: DOMPurify.sanitize(user.bio) }} />
Markdown renderers count as HTML sinks when raw HTML is enabled: marked without a sanitiser, markdown-it with html: true, react-markdown with rehype-raw and no rehype-sanitize.
URLs are sinks too. href, src, formaction, location.href = …, window.open(…) with user data accept javascript: (and data: for some sinks). Validate the scheme (https:, mailto:) rather than relying on the framework's version-dependent handling.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 117 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A afcd169df673
web-frontend-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository makifbaysal/tasktrooper (113 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 1,755 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-09.
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