Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add mappedsky/seizu --skill repo-cve-findingsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mappedsky/seizuWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mappedsky/seizu/repo-cve-findings)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mappedsky/seizu/repo-cve-findings"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mappedsky/seizu/repo-cve-findings/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mappedsky/seizu/repo-cve-findings"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mappedsky/seizu/repo-cve-findings.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.01186 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00027 | $0.00593 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00237 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00119 |
Grade A, and why
repo-cve-findings scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 41 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
List the CVEs the security graph records against the repo input, and confirm from the graph which of them correspond to a version actually installed in that repository. Do not read repository source in this step — reachability is a separate skill.
Inputs — the values arrive in the ## Inputs block below these instructions:
repo— the repository to review.cve_ids— comma-separated; empty means the highest-severity open findings.max_cves— how many findings to keep whencve_idsis empty.severity— the severity filter to pass through to the graph.
Tool arguments — use exactly these field names:
github_security__repo_risk_summary: org, repos, exclude_forks, include_archivedgithub_security__sync_freshness: orggithub_security__top_vulnerabilities: org, repos, state, severity, limit, exclude_forks, include_archivedgithub_security__repo_dependencies: repos, packages, manifest, org, limitcve_analysis__get_cve: cve_id
The graph is the authority on which repository this is. repo may be a bare name, or carry an owner the requester assumed — never take the owner from your own knowledge of the project, because a well-known upstream org (lyft/…, netflix/…) is usually not the org that was actually scanned.
Workflow:
- Resolve the repository. Call
github_security__repo_risk_summarywithorg=""(empty matches every organization in the graph) andrepos=the bare repository name — the part ofrepoafter/if it has one. Take therepofullname from the row it returns and use it from here on; say so plainly if its owner differs from what the request implied. If it returns no row, the graph holds no such repository: report that, name the closest repositories you can see, and stop. Do not go looking for the project on the internet. - Call
github_security__sync_freshnesswith the resolved org. State the newest sync timestamp and qualify the findings if the data is old. - Call
github_security__top_vulnerabilitieswith the resolved org,repos=the resolved fullname,state='open',severity=theseverityinput,include_archived=true,exclude_forks=false,limit=100.reposfilters in the query, before ranking and the limit, so every row is already this repository's. Call it once. - Cut the working set to
max_cves. Ifcve_idsis non-empty, keep only those CVE/GHSA identifiers and say which of them the graph has no row for. Otherwise keep the highestmax_cvesby severity, then EPSS, then CVSS. This is a hard cap on every section below, not a suggestion: report exactly the advisories you kept, and state how many you dropped and on what ranking. A longer table is not more useful — the reachability review reads this list and inspects source for each entry, so every extra row costs a full investigation. - Confirm what is installed. Call
github_security__repo_dependenciesonce, withrepos=the resolved fullname andpackages=every package name from step 4 as one comma-separated list. Compare each finding'svulnerable_rangeandpatched_versionagainst theresolved_versionreturned. A row whosemanifestis a lockfile (Pipfile.lock,poetry.lock,package-lock.json,go.sum, …) is the resolved truth; a row from a bare manifest with no version is only a declaration. - Do not call
cve_analysis__get_cveper finding —top_vulnerabilitiesalready returns severity, CVSS, EPSS, the advisory summary and the patched version. Call it only for a CVE whoseadvisorycame back empty, at most three times.
Output format — this is consumed by the reachability review, so keep it exact:
Repository: resolved fullname, default branch, visibility, sync timestamp.Findings: a table with CVE | GHSA | package | ecosystem | severity | CVSS | EPSS | scope | manifest | vulnerable range | patched version | resolved version | installed? (yes / no / unknown).Not installed: findings whose resolved version is outside the vulnerable range, or where the package no longer appears — these need no reachability review, and say why.To review: the CVE ids whose vulnerable version is installed, ordered by severity then EPSS. This list is the input to the reachability review.Gaps: stale sync data, packages the graph has no dependency row for, missing resolved versions.- Keep every claim evidence-backed. Do not state a verdict about exploitability here; that is the next skill's job.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 41 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A 8a71a1f1bfee
repo-cve-findings is a skill published in the GitHub repository mappedsky/seizu (5 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 1,186 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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