Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill 20-supply-chain-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-SkillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/20-supply-chain-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/20-supply-chain-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/20-supply-chain-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/20-supply-chain-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/20-supply-chain-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00047 | $0.02642 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.01321 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00528 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00264 |
Grade A, and why
Supply Chain Security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 201 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply Chain Security
Purpose
Enable Claude to assess and harden the software supply chain end-to-end: what a project depends on, how those dependencies got in, how they were built, and how anyone downstream can trust the result. This complements Skill 02 (Vulnerability Scanner) — Skill 02 asks "is this known-vulnerable version?"; this skill asks "is this dependency, build, or pipeline something to trust at all?"
Activation Triggers
This skill activates when the user asks about:
- SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) generation, validation, or analysis (CycloneDX, SPDX)
- Dependency confusion, typosquatting, or malicious/compromised packages (npm, PyPI, RubyGems, crates.io, Maven, Go modules)
- Suspicious
postinstall/preinstallscripts or other package lifecycle hooks - CI/CD pipeline security — GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins hardening
- Artifact signing, provenance, or attestation — SLSA levels, in-toto, Sigstore/cosign, npm provenance
- Build reproducibility or "does this build match what's published" questions
- Vendor/open-source component risk as part of onboarding a new dependency
- Incidents referencing a compromised upstream package, maintainer account takeover, or a poisoned build pipeline
Prerequisites
pip install pyyaml requests
Optional enhanced tools:
syft/cyclonedx-py/cdxgen— SBOM generation (CycloneDX/SPDX)grype/osv-scanner— SBOM-driven vulnerability matching (pairs with Skill 02)cosign— artifact/image signing and verification (Sigstore)slsa-verifier— verify SLSA provenance attestationsscorecard(OpenSSF) — automated supply-chain risk scoring for a GitHub repo
Core Capabilities
1. SBOM Generation & Analysis
When the user asks to generate or review an SBOM:
- Identify the ecosystem(s) in the project (see manifest map below) and generate a CycloneDX or SPDX SBOM with the appropriate tool (
syft dir:. -o cyclonedx-json,cyclonedx-py, or language-native equivalents) — or, without tooling, build a manual component list directly from lockfiles. - For each component, capture: name, version, ecosystem/PURL, declared license, and (if available) known vulnerabilities.
- Cross-reference against Skill 02's vulnerability scanning for a combined SBOM+VEX view: which components are affected, and which affected components are actually reachable in the code.
- Flag components with no discoverable source repository, an unusually recent first-publish date paired with a sudden high download count, or a license that conflicts with project policy (e.g., copyleft in a proprietary product).
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday Changed abb2c07db69f
- 4d ago First seen · 201 lines · 47 tokens per session scan A 528cd5896935
Supply Chain Security is a skill published in the GitHub repository Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill (408 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 2,642 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
Other skills, from other repositories
supply-chain-security-expert
Secure the path from dependency to deployed artefact: SBOMs, dependency scanning, build provenance, artefact signing and CI/CD integrity. Use when the user mentions supply chain security, SBOM, CycloneDX or SPDX, SCA or dependency scanning, Sigstore or cosign, SLSA, provenance and attestation, a compromised or…
implementing-supply-chain-security-with-in-toto
Implement software supply chain integrity verification for container builds using the in-toto framework to create cryptographically signed attestations across CI/CD pipeline steps.
implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign
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verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore
Verify signed artifacts and SLSA build provenance with Sigstore cosign and slsa-verifier, enforce keyless OIDC identity, and apply SLSA Build levels to harden the software supply chain.
implementing-aqua-security-for-container-scanning
Deploy Aqua Security's Trivy scanner to detect vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, secrets, and license issues in container images across CI/CD pipelines and registries.
performing-supply-chain-attack-simulation
Simulate and detect software supply chain attacks including typosquatting detection via Levenshtein distance, dependency confusion testing against private registries, package hash verification with pip, and known vulnerability scanning with pip-audit.