Auto-Company: Skill for Claude Code

.claude/skills/deep-analysis/SKILL.md

deep-analysis is a skill for Claude Code from MaxMiksa/Auto-Company. It costs 32 tokens per session (2,870 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A collection of structured thinking patterns for detailed evaluations, code audits, security analysis, and performance reviews.

In plain words
What is it for?
Reviewing code, investigating security concerns, evaluating performance, and carrying out comprehensive analyses.
Why use it?
It helps organise thorough investigations so important issues are less likely to be missed.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: allowed-tools in frontmatter.

This is MaxMiksa/Auto-Company's own configuration. It tells Claude Code how to work on Auto-Company itself, so it is not a mod to install elsewhere. Copy it as a starting point and replace the rules that are about this project. Everything Auto-Company configures →

About the project

Auto-Company is a software system that runs a recurring team of AI agents on a personal computer, where the agents plan work, make decisions, write code, deploy applications, and handle marketing. It is intended for autonomous product development on Windows, Linux, or macOS, using command-line agent tools and a local dashboard to track cycles and results. The catalogue entries are skills, agents, settings, and instructions that support this automated workflow.

MaxMiksa/Auto-Company · 3,141 stars · on GitHub

Reuse

Borrowing it

Nothing to install: this file belongs to MaxMiksa/Auto-Company. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.

Copy the file
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MaxMiksa/Auto-Company/main/.claude/skills/deep-analysis/SKILL.md
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MaxMiksa/Auto-Company

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for deep-analysis

README.md
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Your own site
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Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for deep-analysis

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/maxmiksa/auto-company/deep-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/maxmiksa/auto-company/deep-analysis.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 32 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 2,870 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00032 $0.02870
Opus 5.5 $0.00013 $0.01148
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00006 $0.00574
Haiku 4.5 $0.00003 $0.00287

Measured 1mo ago against content hash ee116608b705, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

deep-analysis scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Origin

Copies of this mod

1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:

.claude/skills/deep-analysis/SKILL.md · 395 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 395 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Deep Analysis Skill

Comprehensive analytical templates for thorough investigation, audits, and evaluations leveraging extended thinking capabilities.

When to Use

  • Code audits requiring systematic review
  • Security assessments and threat modeling
  • Performance analysis and optimization planning
  • Architecture reviews and technical debt assessment
  • Incident post-mortems and root cause analysis
  • Compliance audits and risk assessments

Analysis Templates

Code Audit Template

## Code Audit Report

**Repository**: [repo-name]
**Scope**: [files/modules audited]
**Date**: [YYYY-MM-DD]
**Auditor**: Claude + [Human reviewer]

### Executive Summary
[2-3 sentence overview of findings]

### Audit Criteria
- [ ] Code quality and maintainability
- [ ] Security vulnerabilities
- [ ] Performance concerns
- [ ] Test coverage
- [ ] Documentation completeness
- [ ] Dependency health

### Critical Findings
| ID | Severity | Location | Issue | Recommendation |
|----|----------|----------|-------|----------------|
| C1 | Critical | file:line | [Issue] | [Fix] |
| C2 | Critical | file:line | [Issue] | [Fix] |

### High Priority Findings
| ID | Severity | Location | Issue | Recommendation |
|----|----------|----------|-------|----------------|
| H1 | High | file:line | [Issue] | [Fix] |

### Medium Priority Findings
[...]

### Low Priority / Suggestions
[...]

### Metrics
| Metric | Value | Target | Status |
|--------|-------|--------|--------|
| Test Coverage | 75% | 80% | ⚠️ |
| Cyclomatic Complexity | 12 | <10 | ⚠️ |
| Technical Debt | 4.2d | <3d | ❌ |
| Security Score | 8/10 | 9/10 | ⚠️ |

### Recommendations
1. **Immediate**: [Critical fixes]
2. **Short-term**: [Within sprint]
3. **Long-term**: [Tech debt reduction]

### Sign-off
- [ ] All critical issues addressed
- [ ] High priority issues have timeline
- [ ] Audit findings documented in backlog

Security Threat Model Template

## Threat Model: [System/Component Name]

**Version**: [1.0]
**Last Updated**: [YYYY-MM-DD]
**Classification**: [Internal/Confidential]

### System Overview
[Brief description of the system being modeled]

### Assets
| Asset | Description | Sensitivity | Owner |
|-------|-------------|-------------|-------|
| User Data | PII, credentials | Critical | Auth Team |
| API Keys | Service credentials | High | DevOps |
| Business Data | Transactions | High | Product |

### Trust Boundaries

┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ External (Untrusted) │ │ [Internet Users] [Third-party APIs] │ └──────────────────┬──────────────────────┘ │ WAF/Load Balancer ┌──────────────────┴──────────────────────┐ │ DMZ (Semi-trusted) │ │ [API Gateway] [CDN] [Public Services] │ └──────────────────┬──────────────────────┘ │ Internal Firewall ┌──────────────────┴──────────────────────┐ │ Internal (Trusted) │ │ [App Servers] [Databases] [Queues] │ └─────────────────────────────────────────┘


### Threat Categories (STRIDE)

#### Spoofing
| Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|--------|------------|--------|------------|
| Credential theft | Medium | High | MFA, rate limiting |
| Session hijacking | Low | High | Secure cookies, HTTPS |

#### Tampering
| Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|--------|------------|--------|------------|
| SQL injection | Medium | Critical | Parameterized queries |
| Data modification | Low | High | Integrity checks |

#### Repudiation
[...]

#### Information Disclosure
[...]

#### Denial of Service
[...]

#### Elevation of Privilege
[...]

### Attack Vectors
1. **Vector 1**: [Description]
   - Entry point: [Where]
   - Technique: [How]
   - Mitigation: [Defense]

### Risk Matrix
| Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Risk Score | Priority |
|--------|------------|--------|------------|----------|
| T1     | High       | Critical | 9 | P1 |
| T2     | Medium     | High | 6 | P2 |
| T3     | Low        | Medium | 3 | P3 |

### Security Controls
| Control | Type | Status | Coverage |
|---------|------|--------|----------|
| WAF | Preventive | ✅ Active | External |
| SAST | Detective | ✅ CI/CD | Code |
| DAST | Detective | ⚠️ Partial | Runtime |
| Encryption | Preventive | ✅ Active | Data |

### Recommendations
1. [Priority 1 recommendations]
2. [Priority 2 recommendations]
3. [Priority 3 recommendations]

Read the full file on GitHub · 395 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 395 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A ee116608b705

Subscribe to this mod's changes

deep-analysis is a skill published in the GitHub repository MaxMiksa/Auto-Company (3,141 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 2,870 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.