Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill analyzing-api-call-tracesgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-api-call-traces)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-api-call-traces"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-api-call-traces.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.00635 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00318 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00127 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00064 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-api-call-traces scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Analyzing API Call Traces
When to Use
- You have a JSON API trace (CAPE/Cuckoo "apistats"/calls, API Monitor export) from a detonation.
- You need to translate raw API calls into high-level behaviors and flag suspicious sequences
(e.g.,
VirtualAllocEx→WriteProcessMemory→CreateRemoteThread).
Do not use this as a substitute for detonation — it consumes an existing trace produced in an isolated sandbox.
Prerequisites
- A JSON API trace with at least an API name per call (and optionally arguments).
Safety & Handling
- Consume traces only; never execute the sample to generate one outside a sandbox.
Workflow
Step 1: Group calls by category
python scripts/analyst.py classify trace.json
Buckets calls into process, memory, file, registry, network, crypto, and synchronization.
Step 2: Detect behavior signatures
Matches ordered API sequences that indicate techniques — remote injection, hollowing,
self-deletion, dynamic API resolution (LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress bursts).
Step 3: Prioritize and report
Rank detected behaviors by severity and map each to ATT&CK.
Validation
- Each API call is categorized; unknown APIs are reported, not dropped silently.
- Injection-style sequences are detected only when the ordered prerequisites are present.
- Detected behaviors map to ATT&CK techniques.
Pitfalls
- Flagging individual benign APIs out of context — the sequence matters.
- Assuming call order in the JSON equals execution order without a timestamp/index.
- Ignoring failed calls (non-zero error) that never actually executed the behavior.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the classifier. - ATT&CK T1106 and the Windows API Index (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 84 lines · 75 tokens per session scan A 50efc21a97fa
analyzing-api-call-traces is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 635 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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