Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill analyzing-malicious-iso-and-container-filesgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-malicious-iso-and-container-files)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-malicious-iso-and-container-files"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-malicious-iso-and-container-files/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-malicious-iso-and-container-files"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-malicious-iso-and-container-files.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00086 | $0.00712 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00356 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00142 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00071 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-malicious-iso-and-container-files scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Analyzing Malicious ISO and Container Files
When to Use
- You have an ISO/IMG/VHD attachment suspected of smuggling a payload (LNK + hidden DLL/EXE/script) past MOTW and scanners.
- You need to enumerate contents and flag hidden/executable entries without mounting the image.
Do not use mounting/auto-run to inspect — that can trigger the lure. Parse the container's directory records statically.
Prerequisites
- The container file (read inertly). Optional:
pycdlibfor full ISO parsing (the script falls back to signature/string carving if absent).
Safety & Handling
- Never mount or open the container interactively; carve statically. Defang any URLs found.
Workflow
Step 1: Identify the container type
python scripts/analyst.py inspect sample.iso
Detects ISO 9660 (CD001), UDF, FAT/VHD signatures and reports the format.
Step 2: Enumerate entries and flag payloads
Lists embedded file signatures (MZ, PK, LNK \x4C\x00\x00\x00, script headers) and flags
hidden/executable/decoy entries.
Step 3: Assess the lure chain
A typical chain is a visible LNK pointing at a hidden DLL/EXE/script in the same image — document the relationship.
Step 4: Extract and route
Carve the hidden payload and route it to the appropriate analysis workflow; defang URLs.
Validation
- The container format is identified by signature.
- Hidden executables/LNKs/scripts are enumerated with offsets.
- The lure→payload relationship is documented.
Pitfalls
- Mounting the image and triggering the lure.
- Missing payloads in less-common container formats (VHDX, UDF) without the right parser.
- Overlooking hidden-attribute files that the file manager would not show.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the inspector. - ATT&CK T1553.005 and ISO 9660 references (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 90 lines · 86 tokens per session scan A 7368745d8887
analyzing-malicious-iso-and-container-files is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 86 tokens to every session and 712 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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