Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill analyzing-pe-imports-and-exportsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-pe-imports-and-exports)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-pe-imports-and-exports"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-pe-imports-and-exports/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-pe-imports-and-exports"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-pe-imports-and-exports.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00076 | $0.00762 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00038 | $0.00381 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00152 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00076 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-pe-imports-and-exports scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 94 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Analyzing PE Imports and Exports
When to Use
- You have a Windows PE and want a fast capability read from its imported APIs.
- You need to identify suspicious API clusters (injection, crypto, anti-analysis) before deeper reversing.
- You are inspecting a malicious DLL's exports to find its callable entry points.
Do not use the import table alone as a verdict — packers stub imports and malware resolves APIs dynamically; a thin IAT can hide real capability.
Prerequisites
pefile(pip install pefile); the sample handled inertly in the lab.
Safety & Handling
- Parse the PE statically; never run it during import analysis.
- Keep the sample password-protected at rest and reference it by hash.
Workflow
Step 1: Parse imports
Enumerate imported DLLs and functions from the import directory (IAT). A sparse IAT plus a
GetProcAddress/LoadLibrary pair suggests dynamic resolution.
python scripts/analyst.py imports sample.exe
Step 2: Map APIs to behaviors
Cluster imports into behavior buckets: networking (Ws2_32, WinINet), process/injection
(VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread), crypto (Crypt*, bcrypt),
persistence (Reg*, service APIs), and anti-analysis (IsDebuggerPresent).
Step 3: Inspect exports
For DLLs, list exports (by name and ordinal). Unusual export names or a single exported
DllRegisterServer/ordinal hint at how the module is invoked.
Step 4: Flag dynamic resolution
Note LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress, ordinal-only imports, and tiny IATs as signs that the real
capability is resolved at runtime — escalate to dynamic/RE workflows.
Validation
- Import behavior buckets are consistent with other static signals (strings, sections).
- A thin or stubbed IAT is recognized as a packing/dynamic-resolution indicator, not "benign".
- Exports of a malicious DLL are enumerated with their invocation method identified.
Pitfalls
- Trusting a small IAT as low-capability when imports are resolved dynamically.
- Ignoring delay-load and bound imports.
- Reading ordinal-only imports without resolving them to function names.
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 94 lines · 76 tokens per session scan A bd6de8769fc5
analyzing-pe-imports-and-exports is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 76 tokens to every session and 762 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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