Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill analyzing-rust-malware-internalsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-rust-malware-internals)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-rust-malware-internals"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-rust-malware-internals.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00067 | $0.00697 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00349 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00139 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00070 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-rust-malware-internals scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Analyzing Rust Malware Internals
When to Use
- You have a Rust-compiled binary and need to confirm the toolchain, demangle symbol names, and enumerate crate dependencies.
- Standard analysis is hampered by Rust's name mangling and large static linking.
Do not use this for non-Rust binaries — confirm the Rust signature first. This skill reads the binary statically and executes nothing.
Prerequisites
- The Rust binary (read inertly).
Safety & Handling
- Read bytes statically; treat strings as untrusted.
Workflow
Step 1: Confirm Rust and toolchain
python scripts/analyst.py info sample.bin
Looks for rustc/cargo markers, the rust panic/unwind strings, and embedded source paths
(/rustc/<hash>/library/..., ~/.cargo/registry/...).
Step 2: Demangle symbol names
Detects v0 (_R...) and legacy (_ZN...17h<hash>E) mangled symbols and demangles them to readable
paths.
Step 3: Enumerate crates
Extract crate names/versions from .cargo/registry/src/.../<crate>-<ver>/ paths to fingerprint
capabilities (e.g., reqwest, tokio, aes, winapi).
Step 4: Map and document
Map notable crates to behavior and ATT&CK.
Validation
- The Rust toolchain signature is confirmed before demangling.
- Demangled names are readable module paths (not still-mangled).
- Crate names/versions are plausible registry entries.
Pitfalls
- Mixing v0 and legacy mangling in one binary — handle both.
- Stripped binaries where only registry path strings remain.
- Static crates inflating the symbol set; focus on the author's crate/
main.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the analyzer/demangler. - Rust v0 mangling RFC and ATT&CK T1027 (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 90 lines · 67 tokens per session scan A d31270b2ae19
analyzing-rust-malware-internals is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 697 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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