Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-webshellsnpx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill analyzing-webshellsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-webshells)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-webshells"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-webshells.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00087 | $0.00741 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00044 | $0.00370 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00148 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00074 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-webshells scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 91 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Analyzing Webshells
When to Use
- You found a suspicious server-side script (
.php,.aspx,.jsp,.asp) and need to confirm it is a webshell and understand its command interface. - You are triaging a web-server compromise and want to classify dropped scripts.
Do not use a live web server to execute the script to "test" it — that runs attacker code. Analyze the source statically.
Prerequisites
- The suspect script file(s), read inertly.
Safety & Handling
- Read the file statically; never deploy or request it on a live server. Defang any URLs.
Workflow
Step 1: Detect execution sinks and input flow
python scripts/analyst.py scan shell.php
Flags dynamic-execution sinks (eval, assert, system, exec, passthru, Runtime.exec,
ASPX eval()/Process.Start) and whether request input ($_GET/$_POST/Request) reaches them.
Step 2: Identify obfuscation/encoder chains
Detects base64_decode, gzinflate, str_rot13, eval(chr(...)), hex \x strings, and
FromBase64String chains commonly wrapping the payload.
Step 3: Decode obvious layers
Apply base64/rot13/gzinflate where present to reveal the inner command interface (best-effort, non-executing).
Step 4: Classify and report
Note the language, the password/parameter gate (if any), and capabilities (file manager, command exec, SQL, upload); defang IOCs.
Validation
- A flagged file pairs an execution sink with attacker-controlled input.
- Encoder chains are identified and, where safe, decoded statically.
- Capability classification is backed by concrete code evidence.
Pitfalls
- Legitimate admin tools that also use
eval/system— corroborate with input flow. - Multi-stage shells that fetch the real logic remotely.
- Deeply nested or runtime-built obfuscation that static decode only partly unwinds.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the scanner. - ATT&CK T1505.003 (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 91 lines · 87 tokens per session scan A 9549fe275cb4
analyzing-webshells is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 87 tokens to every session and 741 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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