Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill analyzing-windows-driver-malwaregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-windows-driver-malware)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-windows-driver-malware"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/analyzing-windows-driver-malware.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00079 | $0.00724 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00362 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00145 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00072 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-windows-driver-malware scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 91 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Analyzing Windows Driver Malware
When to Use
- You have a
.syskernel driver (malicious rootkit driver or a vulnerable driver used for BYOVD) and need to identify its entry, IRP/IOCTL handlers, and dangerous kernel operations. - You are assessing privilege-escalation or kernel-stealth risk.
Do not use this by loading the driver — analyze it statically. Loading kernel code is dangerous and is the threat itself.
Prerequisites
- The driver
.sys(read inertly).
Safety & Handling
- Read bytes statically; never install/load the driver. Note its signing status for BYOVD context.
Workflow
Step 1: Confirm it is a kernel driver
python scripts/analyst.py inspect driver.sys
Verifies the PE native subsystem (1), kernel imports (ntoskrnl.exe, hal.dll), and reports
imported kernel APIs.
Step 2: Identify dispatch and dangerous primitives
Flag IRP/IOCTL handling (IoCreateDevice, IoCreateSymbolicLink, IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL),
arbitrary read/write primitives (MmMapIoSpace, ZwMapViewOfSection, MmCopyMemory), and
callback registration (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, ObRegisterCallbacks).
Step 3: Assess BYOVD/stealth potential
Map exposed IOCTLs to capabilities (physical memory access, process kill, token theft) that BYOVD abuse relies on.
Step 4: Document
Record the driver's handlers, dangerous primitives, signing status, and risk.
Validation
- Native subsystem and kernel imports confirm a driver.
- Dispatch/IOCTL and dangerous-primitive imports are reported with evidence.
- Capabilities are tied to concrete imported APIs.
Pitfalls
- Legitimate vendor drivers that are nonetheless exploitable (BYOVD) — context matters.
- Drivers resolving APIs dynamically, hiding imports.
- Confusing user-mode helper components with the kernel driver itself.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the inspector. - WDK and ATT&CK T1068 references (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 91 lines · 79 tokens per session scan A f4bfea0346cc
analyzing-windows-driver-malware is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 79 tokens to every session and 724 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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