Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkitsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkits)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkits"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkits/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkits"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkits.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.00728 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00364 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00146 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00073 |
Grade A, and why
dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkits scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 89 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Dissecting Boot and Kernel Rootkits
When to Use
- You have a sample (MBR/VBR image, UEFI module, or kernel driver) suspected of boot-process or kernel-level tampering and stealth.
- You need to identify the persistence vector and stealth technique class statically.
Do not use this on production firmware/boot media without acquisition — analyze a captured image. The skill reads bytes statically and executes nothing.
Prerequisites
- The boot image / UEFI module / driver (read inertly).
Safety & Handling
- Read bytes statically; never write the sample to boot media or load the driver.
Workflow
Step 1: Classify the artifact
python scripts/analyst.py classify sample.bin
Detects MBR/VBR (boot signature 0x55AA at 0x1FE), UEFI modules (PE with EFI subsystem / PI
GUIDs / EFI_ strings), and kernel drivers (PE importing ntoskrnl/hal, .sys indicators).
Step 2: Identify tampering / hooking indicators
Flag disk-write primitives (Int 13h for MBR bootkits), SSDT/IRP hooking and Zw*/Ke* kernel
APIs, DKOM strings, and driver-callback registration.
Step 3: Map the persistence vector
Determine whether persistence is via MBR/VBR overwrite, UEFI variable/module, or driver service.
Step 4: Document
Record the artifact type, persistence vector, and stealth technique class, mapping to ATT&CK.
Validation
- The artifact type is identified by concrete signatures (boot signature, PE subsystem, imports).
- Tampering/hooking indicators reference real primitives, not generic strings.
- The persistence vector is stated with its evidence.
Pitfalls
- A legitimate bootloader/driver resembling a bootkit/rootkit — corroborate with behavior.
- UEFI modules requiring firmware-volume parsing beyond simple PE checks.
- Kernel samples needing signed-driver and callback context to confirm stealth.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the classifier. - ATT&CK T1542.003 and T1014 (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 89 lines · 75 tokens per session scan A 30af1d5e61a2
dissecting-boot-and-kernel-rootkits is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 728 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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