Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistencegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00083 | $0.00711 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00042 | $0.00356 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00142 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00071 |
Grade A, and why
hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Hunting WMI Event Subscription Persistence
When to Use
- You have Sysmon WMI telemetry (Event ID 19 filter, 20 consumer, 21 binding) or a WMI repository export and want to find malicious permanent event subscriptions.
- You are investigating fileless persistence that survives reboots via WMI.
Do not use this for transient WMI process calls (T1047 execution) — this targets persistent __EventFilter/__EventConsumer subscriptions specifically.
Prerequisites
- Sysmon EID 19/20/21 events (CSV/JSON) or an exported subscription listing.
Workflow
Step 1: Parse and correlate triad records
python scripts/analyst.py hunt wmi_events.csv
Groups filters, consumers, and bindings, and flags consumers whose payload is suspicious
(CommandLineEventConsumer running scripts/encoded commands, ActiveScriptEventConsumer with
inline VBScript/JScript).
Step 2: Assess the trigger
Inspect the __EventFilter query — common malicious triggers fire on logon, time intervals
(__InstanceModificationEvent within), or process start.
Step 3: Confirm maliciousness
Legitimate management subscriptions exist; weight inline scripts, encoded commands, and unusual consumer names.
Step 4: Operationalize
Write a Sigma/EDR rule for new ActiveScript/CommandLine consumers.
Validation
- Filter, consumer, and binding are correlated into a complete subscription where possible.
- Suspicious consumers are flagged by payload content, not consumer existence alone.
- Findings map to ATT&CK T1546.003.
Pitfalls
- Legitimate monitoring tools (SCCM, antivirus) create subscriptions — corroborate.
- Missing the binding that links an otherwise-benign-looking filter and consumer.
- Encoded PowerShell inside a consumer obscuring intent.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the hunter. - ATT&CK T1546.003 and Sysmon WMI events (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 89 lines · 83 tokens per session scan A 99e79b82859f
hunting-wmi-event-subscription-persistence is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 83 tokens to every session and 711 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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