Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill manually-unpacking-a-packed-binarygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/manually-unpacking-a-packed-binary)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/manually-unpacking-a-packed-binary"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/manually-unpacking-a-packed-binary/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/manually-unpacking-a-packed-binary"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/manually-unpacking-a-packed-binary.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00074 | $0.00712 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00356 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00142 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00071 |
Grade A, and why
manually-unpacking-a-packed-binary scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 91 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Manually Unpacking a Packed Binary
When to Use
- A sample is runtime-packed by a custom/unknown packer that UPX and generic unpackers cannot handle.
- You need to locate the original entry point (OEP) and dump the unpacked image for static analysis.
Do not use generic auto-unpackers here — this is the manual path for cases where they fail. Run the sample only inside an isolated, instrumented debugger VM.
Prerequisites
- A debugger (x64dbg) on an isolated VM and the packed sample.
Safety & Handling
- The sample executes during unpacking; do this only in a disposable, isolated VM with snapshots.
Workflow
Step 1: Characterize the packer statically
python scripts/analyst.py inspect packed.exe
Reports section entropy, suspicious section names (UPX, .vmp, random), small import tables,
and a write-then-execute section (classic unpacker stub).
Step 2: Find candidate OEP heuristics
Set a memory breakpoint on the unpacked code section's execution; the packer's tail jump (a far
jmp/ret into a different section) typically transfers control to the OEP.
Step 3: Dump at OEP
When stopped at OEP, dump the process image and proceed to import reconstruction (see the dump-and-rebuild skill).
Step 4: Verify the dump
Confirm the dumped image has a sane entry point, restored imports, and readable code.
Validation
- The unpacking stub is identified by a write→execute section transition.
- The tail jump lands in a different section than the stub (OEP candidate).
- The dumped image disassembles cleanly with recognizable runtime startup code.
Pitfalls
- Stopping at a stage-2 stub rather than the true OEP in multi-layer packers.
- Hardware-breakpoint detection by the packer — vary the breakpoint strategy.
- Dumping before the import table is fully resolved.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the inspector. - ATT&CK T1027.002 and the PE format spec (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 91 lines · 74 tokens per session scan A b7063f447a7f
manually-unpacking-a-packed-binary is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 74 tokens to every session and 712 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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