Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill monitoring-process-and-file-behaviorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/monitoring-process-and-file-behavior)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/monitoring-process-and-file-behavior"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/monitoring-process-and-file-behavior/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/monitoring-process-and-file-behavior"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/monitoring-process-and-file-behavior.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00071 | $0.00709 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00354 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00142 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00071 |
Grade A, and why
monitoring-process-and-file-behavior scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 93 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Monitoring Process and File Behavior
When to Use
- You have a Procmon CSV/XML export (or equivalent sandbox operation log) from detonating a sample.
- You need a concise behavioral profile: child processes, file writes, registry persistence, and network-related calls.
- You are correlating dynamic behavior with static indicators.
Do not use this to detonate the sample yourself — it consumes already-captured logs. Run the sample only inside an isolated, instrumented sandbox you own.
Prerequisites
- A Procmon CSV export (or comparable operation log) from an isolated detonation.
Safety & Handling
- Only consume logs; never execute the sample on an analyst workstation.
- Defang any captured URLs/hosts before sharing.
Workflow
Step 1: Summarize operations by category
python scripts/analyst.py summarize procmon.csv
Counts operations by class (Process/Thread, File, Registry, Network) and lists the busiest paths.
Step 2: Identify process tree
Extract Process Create events to reconstruct parent/child relationships and command lines —
LOLBins (powershell, rundll32, mshta) spawned from the sample are high-signal.
Step 3: Identify persistence and drops
Registry writes under Run/RunOnce/services, and file writes to %APPDATA%/%TEMP%/startup,
indicate persistence and staged payloads.
Step 4: Build the behavioral profile
Map observed operations to ATT&CK techniques and defang any network endpoints.
Validation
- The process tree reconstructs from
Process Createevents. - File and registry writes are categorized with their target paths.
- Observed behaviors map to specific ATT&CK techniques.
Pitfalls
- Treating noisy read operations as significant — writes and creates carry the signal.
- Missing short-lived child processes that exited before capture stopped.
- Ignoring path normalization (
%TEMP%vs absolute) when deduplicating.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the summarizer. - ATT&CK T1106 and Process Monitor docs (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 93 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A 37c93284c984
monitoring-process-and-file-behavior is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 709 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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