Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to milzamsz/flaredeck. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/milzamsz/flaredeck/main/.agents/skills/flaredeck-security-review/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/milzamsz/flaredeckWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/milzamsz/flaredeck/flaredeck-security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/milzamsz/flaredeck/flaredeck-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/milzamsz/flaredeck/flaredeck-security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/milzamsz/flaredeck/flaredeck-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/milzamsz/flaredeck/flaredeck-security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00056 | $0.00343 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00171 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00069 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00034 |
Grade A, and why
flaredeck-security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
FlareDeck Security Review
Required references
docs/security/THREAT-MODEL.mddocs/security/SECRET-HANDLING.mddocs/security/TRUST-AND-APPROVAL.md- relevant ADRs and specifications
Procedure
- Map attacker-controlled inputs and trust boundaries.
- Trace data and control flow from interface to infrastructure.
- Check secret containment and redaction at every output boundary.
- Check trust approval, fingerprint invalidation, and fail-closed behavior.
- Check command, argument, path, environment, readiness, and route validation.
- Check process ownership, process-tree termination, PID recovery, cancellation, crashloops, and cleanup.
- Check MCP schema, stdout discipline, result bounds, and prohibited capabilities.
- Check public-exposure and DNS mutation risk.
- Run canary-secret and malicious-input tests where possible.
- Report threats, controls, findings, and decision.
Block immediately when
- an interface can return a token, credential, or environment value;
- an agent can approve trust;
- a caller can supply an arbitrary command;
- a session can stop or delete unowned resources;
- remote MCP is introduced without a new threat model;
- state corruption causes automatic trust or fail-open behavior.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 38 lines · 56 tokens per session scan A 3f6ded5b1bfe
flaredeck-security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository milzamsz/flaredeck (5 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 343 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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