Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill abort-templategit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/abort-template)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/abort-template"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/abort-template/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/abort-template"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/abort-template.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00032 | $0.00898 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00449 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00180 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00090 |
Grade A, and why
abort-template scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 75 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Abort / Crisis Plan Generator
The abort plan defines when the agent stops. Without it, the autonomous loop runs through real-incident alerts, scope violations, and production-data exposures as if they were normal operations.
AI-specific gates address the failure modes documented in OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2025.12) — hallucination, prompt injection, unverified destructive actions.
When to Use
- After CONOPS + Threat Profile + Data Handling are written (the kill chain shapes which triggers are relevant)
- User says "create abort plan", "halt triggers", "emergency stop", "safety gates"
Workflow
Step 1: Keep the Three Default Triggers
The AbortPlan schema seeds three default halt triggers. Keep all three; do not remove unless the engagement is explicitly read-only:
EMERGENCY— Real-incident alert from blue team / SOCCRITICAL— Production data observed in collected evidenceCRITICAL— Scope boundary violation detected
Step 2: Add Engagement-Specific Triggers
Based on the interview answers, add custom AbortTrigger entries. Common additions:
| Engagement signal | Severity | Response |
|---|---|---|
| Tier-3+ adversary emulation against critical infrastructure | EMERGENCY |
Halt + operator-page + 1hr cooldown |
| Compliance-bound data class encountered (GDPR / HIPAA) | CRITICAL |
Halt; redact; await operator |
| Network outage or latency spike on target | WARNING |
Pause active scanning; resume after 5min |
| LLM cost-per-objective threshold exceeded | WARNING |
Pause; ask operator to approve budget |
| C2 beacon lost for > 30 minutes during active phase | WARNING |
Pause; re-establish C2 before continuing |
Step 3: Set AI Safety Gates
hallucination_threshold— default 3 (after 3 unverified-success claims, force evidence-collection mode). Lower (2) for high-stakes engagements; never set 0.destructive_action_gate— default True. Set False only for read-only / recon-only engagements where norm,drop,format,delete-policycommands will run.output_validation— default"verify-evidence-hash". Override to"second-tool-confirm"for engagements where evidence cannot be hashed (e.g. real-time API responses).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 75 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A 277beecb17c9
abort-template is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 898 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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