Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill access-controlgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/access-control)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/access-control"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/access-control/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/access-control"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/access-control.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00026 | $0.01709 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00855 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00342 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00171 |
Grade A, and why
access-control scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
94% identical to access-control — 2 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 202 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Access Control Playbook
Access control bugs are the most boring class — and the most common in production audits. They're cheap to find with grep + LSP. They drain millions when missed (LeetSwap, Audius, Saddle, Akropolis).
Audit steps
1. Find every state-changing function
# Functions that are NOT view/pure and NOT internal/private
grep -rE 'function [a-zA-Z_]+\(.*\)(public|external)' src/ | grep -v 'view\|pure'
# Or via slither
slither . --print function-summary
2. For each external/public state-changer, ask
- Does it modify storage that affects user funds, ownership, or configuration?
- Is there a modifier (
onlyOwner,onlyRole,onlyDAO, custom auth)? - If yes, what's the modifier checking?
- If no, should there be one?
3. Audit each modifier
Common modifier patterns + bugs:
| Pattern | Bug |
|---|---|
require(msg.sender == owner) |
owner settable by anyone? setOwner unprotected? |
require(msg.sender == tx.origin) |
Wrong — tx.origin breaks meta-transactions, AND it's phishable |
_msgSender() in OZ ERC2771Context |
Forwarder trusted but anyone can forward — does the contract validate the forwarder? |
onlyRole(MINTER) |
Who can grant MINTER? Is the admin a multisig or single key? |
require(initialized == false) |
Initializer can be called twice if initialized writeable elsewhere |
require(block.timestamp > deployTime + 24 hours) |
Time-based is often a fake delay — check if deployTime is settable |
require(approvedSigners[msg.sender]) |
Approval list managed by single key? |
4. Specific anti-patterns to grep
# Functions accidentally external (default in Solidity <0.5)
grep -rn 'function [a-zA-Z_]*[^ ]* *{' src/ | grep -v 'internal\|private\|public\|external'
# msg.sender == tx.origin (phishable)
grep -rn 'tx.origin' src/
# Reentrancy in access-control checks
grep -rn 'onlyOwner.*nonReentrant' src/ # both? often wrong order
# `delegatecall` without auth gate
grep -rn 'delegatecall' src/
# `selfdestruct` available
grep -rn 'selfdestruct\|suicide(' src/
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 202 lines · 26 tokens per session scan A 0aeae4b97803
access-control is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 26 tokens to every session and 1,709 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 94% identical to access-control, differing in 2 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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