Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill c2git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/c2)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/c2"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/c2/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/c2"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/c2.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00034 | $0.02299 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.01149 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00460 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00230 |
Grade A, and why
c2 scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 217 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Command & Control (C2) Knowledge Base
C2 infrastructure enables persistent, covert communication between the operator and implants deployed on target systems. Proper C2 setup minimizes detection, ensures operational resilience through redirectors, and provides the foundation for all post-exploitation activity.
Atlas C2 Architecture
C2 servers run as separate containers on
sandbox-net, selectable via docker compose profiles. The Kali sandbox has C2 clients only — servers are never co-located with the attack box.
Framework Container Profile Client in Sandbox Sliver c2-sliverc2-sliver(default in.env)sliver-clientHavoc c2-havocc2-havoc(future)havoc-client(future)Default:
COMPOSE_PROFILES=c2-sliverin.env→docker compose up -dstarts Sliver. Swap: changeCOMPOSE_PROFILESvalue to use a different C2 framework. For framework-specific setup, consult the dedicated skill:c2-sliver,c2-havoc, etc.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique ID | Name | C2 Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | HTTPS-based C2 channels |
| T1071.004 | Application Layer Protocol: DNS | DNS-based C2 channels |
| T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography | mTLS, AES-encrypted payloads |
| T1090.002 | Proxy: External Proxy | Redirectors, CDN fronting |
| T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Upload/download via implant |
| T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | DNS tunneling, port forwarding |
1. C2 Channel Types
| Channel | Port | Stealth | Speed | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HTTPS | 443 | High (blends with web) | Fast | Primary channel |
| DNS | 53 | Very High (rarely blocked) | Slow | Fallback / restricted networks |
| mTLS | Custom | High (mutual auth) | Fast | High-security sessions |
| WireGuard | 51820 | Medium | Fast | Tunneled access, pivoting |
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 217 lines · 34 tokens per session scan A 27936f5e1b6a
c2 is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 34 tokens to every session and 2,299 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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