Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill conops-templategit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/conops-template)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/conops-template"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/conops-template/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/conops-template"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/conops-template.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00031 | $0.00662 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00331 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00132 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00066 |
Grade A, and why
conops-template scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 75 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Generator
The CONOPS bridges the legal RoE and the tactical OPPLAN. It must be readable by a CEO while containing enough detail for operators.
When to Use
- After
roe.jsonexists - User says "create CONOPS", "design the operation", "build threat model"
- Before OPPLAN can be generated
Prerequisites
Read roe.json first — scope and boundaries constrain the CONOPS.
See ../references/schema-quick-reference.md for the CONOPS, ThreatActor, KillChainPhase, and DeconflictionPlan schema fields.
Workflow
Step 1: Interview the User
Round 1 — Threat Model:
- Which threat actor to emulate? (Use
threat-profileskill for detailed profiling)- a) Opportunistic external attacker (low)
- b) Targeted cybercriminal (medium)
- c) APT / nation-state (high)
- d) Insider threat
- e) Custom — describe
- What is the attacker's motivation? (financial, espionage, disruption, hacktivism)
- What initial access vector would this actor use?
Round 2 — Operations: 4. Attack narrative — 2-3 sentence scenario description 5. Ultimate objectives — what does the attacker want to achieve? 6. Communication plan — how does the red team communicate internally and with client? 7. Deconfliction method — how to distinguish red team from real attacks? 8. Success criteria — what constitutes engagement success?
Step 2: Design Kill Chain
Based on RoE scope + threat profile, select applicable phases. See references/kill-chain-templates.md.
Key rule: Don't include phases outside RoE scope. Recon-only engagement → only recon phase.
Step 3: Generate Documents
conops.json— matchingCONOPSschemadeconfliction.json— matchingDeconflictionPlanschema
Step 4: Validate
- Executive summary contains no jargon or tool names
- Kill chain phases align with RoE scope
- All MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs are valid
- Timeline has concrete date ranges
- At least 2 success criteria defined
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 75 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A 0f45fa8fb936
conops-template is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 31 tokens to every session and 662 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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